A friend of mine was enjoying a coffee break at an Open University seminar for his philosophy course. Out of the blue, a colleague asked him, “Why do you believe in God?” He was a bit taken aback but, after a few deep breaths, managed to order his thoughts and summarised several different lines of argument. As he did so, he found that other conversations in the room gradually stopped, until everyone was listening to him. When he finished, his questioner said, “That is amazing. I have never heard anyone answer that question before. In fact, I did not think that Christians had reasons for belief in God.”

Certainly, the reasons we can offer are diverse, and some seem more compelling than others. I was particularly interested to see recently the 90 minute DVD called “Collision”, which features atheist Christopher Hitchens and Christian pastor Douglas Wilson in dialogue on a book promotion tour.[1] I have yet to read their book, which is a conversation between them on the subject, “Is Christianity Good for the World?”

The film, anyway, is sharp, quirky and engaging. They both speak with wit and candour, and don’t pull any punches. On the dust cover, Hitchens is quoted as saying, “Christianity is a wicked cult and it is high time we left it behind.” Wilson is quoted alongside saying, “There are two tenets of atheism. One, there is no God. Two, I hate him.” This rough and tumble dialogue is certainly educational, though not for the faint-hearted!

Despite appearances, they both hold each other in mutual respect, and this is shown in a number of informal exchanges, where they have almost forgotten that the cameras are still rolling. A particular sequence comes right at the end of the film, when they are relaxing together as passengers in a car.

Hitchens raised the question as to which was the strongest argument used against atheists and he had no difficulty in identifying it. “The fine-tuning argument we all agree is the most intriguing. It is not trivial – we all say that.” Here he is clearly speaking for his New Atheist friends. Hitchens is emphatic and repeats the point, “We all agree about that.”

Now one might be forgiven for not realising this, as Dawkins is quite dismissive of the fine-tuning argument. He states the problem correctly: “Physicists have calculated that, if the laws and constants of physics had been even slightly different, the universe would have developed in such a way that life would have been impossible.” This mystery has become known as the Goldilocks Enigma, because the universe appears to be ‘just right’ for us in the same way as the little bear’s porridge, chair and bed were all ‘just right’ for Goldilocks in the children’s story.

Dawkins concludes, “As ever, the theist’s answer is deeply unsatisfying, because it leaves the existence of God unexplained. A God capable of calculating the Goldilocks values … would have to be at least as improbable as the finely tuned combination of numbers itself, and that is very improbable indeed.” He is left marvelling at the number of people, who seem genuinely satisfied by the ‘Divine Knob-Twiddler’ argument, as he crudely puts it.[2]

Let us then revisit the argument. For the universe to exist as it does and allow intelligent life to exist, it requires an astonishing series of ‘coincidences’ to have occurred. Stephen Hawking suggested that it is like a hoard of monkeys hammering away on typewriters and by pure chance eventually producing one of Shakespeare's sonnets.[3]

The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life… It seems clear that there are relatively few ranges of values for the numbers that would allow the development of any form of intelligent life. Most sets of values would give rise to universes that, although they might be very beautiful, would contain no one able to wonder at their beauty.[4]

Physicist Paul Davies estimated that for electromagnetism a change of only one part in 10 to the power of 40 would have spelled disaster for stars, like our sun, thereby precluding the existence of planets.

The gravitational force must be what it is for planets to have stable orbits around the sun. Otherwise if they had a greater force they would fall into the sun and burn up or if weaker, they would escape from their orbit into a very cold outer darkness. It is estimated that a change in gravity by only one part in 10 to the power of 100 would have prevented a life permitting universe.[5]

If the electric charge on an electron were only slightly different, stars would be unable to burn hydrogen and helium[6] and produce the chemical elements such as carbon and oxygen that make up our bodies. Similarly, the orbit of electrons in atoms would not be stable, so matter as we know it would not exist.

Stephen Hawking wrote, “If the rate of expansion one second after the big bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe would have re-collapsed before it ever reached its present size.”[7]

Not only must each of these quantities be exquisitely fine tuned but their ratios to each other must be finely tuned. As William Craig writes, “Improbability is added to improbability until our minds are reeling in incomprehensible numbers.”[8]

How are these extraordinary numbers to be explained? The most popular explanation and the one that appeals to Dawkins, is the ‘multiverse’. The idea here is that, unbeknown to us, there are other universes, all slightly different, so that it becomes more likely that in that number, a universe like ours might exist. Davies wrote, “The multiverse theory seeks to replace the appearance of design by the hand of chance.”[9] I have read some accounts that leave one to believe that a relatively small number of other universes would significantly alter the probabilities. That however is clearly not the case.

How many universes then would you need to make it at all probable that one of them could be like our universe? String theorists posit a number of 10 to the power of 500. It might help to see that number written out. It is 1 with 500 zeroes after it.

Here goes: 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000.

Now that is an awful lot of universes, particularly since the estimate for the total number of atoms in the entire observable universe is no more than 10 to the power of 80.[10]
Now it must be understood that there is no hard evidence at all for the existence of any other universes and, if they exist, we would never be able to see them or have any contact with them. Can this then be considered a scientific idea if it cannot be tested by experiment or observation? Davies states, “It can be validly objected that a theory which rests on entities that are in principle unobservable cannot be described as scientific.”[11]

Well might William of Occam turn uneasily in his grave! This 14th century English friar proposed the idea (known as Occam’s Razor) that one should not multiply causes needlessly. The simpler of two competing explanations is generally to be preferred, unless that simpler explanation can be confidently ruled out.

In fact, I think I heard old William chuckle the other day, unless it was thunder. He must have been reading his copy of New Scientist, dated 28 October 2009.[12] An article entitled ‘Multiplying universes: How many is the multiverse?’ put forward the latest thinking from cosmologists Andre Linde and Vitaly Vanchurin, suggesting a number of 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 million universes. Unlike the String theorist figure of 10 with 500 zeroes after it, this new figure could not possibly be written out. Interestingly, the article itself gets the number wrong, greatly underestimating its size – they evidently couldn’t believe it either! It is a number so utterly vast as to defy any sensible comment!

Having said that, is it possible that this is either a little cosmological joke (ho, ho, ho!) or have they produced something very close to a mathematical proof for the existence of God? Either way, I cannot imagine that the New Atheists will fall over themselves in their rush to comment!

Question:

How do you answer sceptics who say that our universe doesn’t need a designer because it’s just a part of a bigger multiverse which is composed of all kinds of universes? No matter how improbable our universe looks, the chances are that there will be some just like it somewhere in the multiverse. If you deal the cards enough times, eventually every hand will come up sooner or later.

Bill


Dr. Craig responds:

The idea that our universe is just a part of a wider multiverse is an expression of what I call the Many Worlds Hypothesis (MWH). This hypothesis is intimately connected with the so-called Anthropic Principle, which states that our own existence acts as a selection principle determining which properties of the universe we can observe. That is to say, any observed properties of the universe which may at first seem to be astonishingly improbable can only be seen in their true perspective after we realize that other properties couldn’t be observed by us, since we can only observe properties of the universe which are compatible with our existence. The Anthropic Principle implies that observers who have evolved within a universe must observe its constants and quantities to be fine-tuned for their existence, for otherwise they wouldn’t exist to observe them. The Anthropic Principle is used by some people to try to show why we shouldn’t be surprised at the astonishingly improbable fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life.

Theorists now recognize that the Anthropic Principle can only legitimately be employed to explain away our observation of fine-tuning when it is conjoined to MWH, according to which an ensemble of concrete universes exists, actualizing a wide range of possibilities. MWH is essentially an effort on the part of partisans of chance to multiply their probabilistic resources in order to reduce the improbability of the occurrence of fine-tuning. As you put it, “if you deal the cards enough times, eventually every hand will come up.” The very fact that otherwise sober scientists must resort to such a remarkable hypothesis is a sort of backhanded compliment to the design hypothesis. It shows that the fine-tuning does cry out for explanation. But is MWH as plausible as the design hypothesis?

If MWH is to commend itself as a plausible hypothesis, then some plausible mechanism for generating the many worlds needs to be to be explained. The best shot at providing a plausible mechanism comes from inflationary cosmology, which is often employed to defend the view that our universe is but one domain (or “pocket universe”) within a vastly larger universe, or multiverse. Alexander Vilenkin is one who vigorously champions the idea that we live in a multiverse (Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes [Hill and Wang, 2006]). At the heart of Vilenkin’s vision of the world is the theory of future-eternal, or everlasting, inflation (Vilenkin misleadingly calls it eternal inflation, even though he proves that the inflationary multiverse has only a finite past). According to generic inflationary theory, our universe exists in a true vacuum state with an energy density that is nearly zero, but earlier it existed in a false vacuum state with a very high energy density. The energy density of the false vacuum overwhelmed even the intense gravitational attraction generated by the high matter density of the early universe, causing a super-rapid, or inflationary, expansion, during which the universe grew from atomic proportions to a size larger than the observable universe in less than a microsecond.

But Vilenkin needs more than generic inflationary theory. In order to ensure everlasting inflation, Vilenkin hypothesizes that the scalar fields determining the energy density and evolution of the false vacuum state were characterized by a certain slope which issued in a false vacuum expanding so rapidly that, as it decays into pockets of true vacuum, the “island universes” thereby generated in this sea of false vacuum, though themselves expanding at enormous rates, cannot keep up with the expansion of the false vacuum and so find themselves increasingly separated with time. New pockets of true vacuum will continue to form in the gaps between the island universes and become themselves isolated worlds. Moreover, each island is subdivided into subdomains which Vilenkin calls O-regions, each constituting an observable universe bounded by an event horizon. Despite the fact that the multiverse is finite and geometrically closed, Vilenkin claims that the false vacuum will go on expanding forever, constantly generating new worlds.

At this point Vilenkin executes a nifty piece of legerdemain. As the island universes expand, their central regions eventually grow dark and barren in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, while stars are constantly forming at their ever-expanding perimeters. We should think of the decay of false vacuum to true vacuum going on at the islands’ expanding perimeters as multiple Big Bangs. From the global perspective of the inflating multiverse, these Big Bangs occur successively over time, as the island boundaries grow with time. In the global time of the multiverse, each island is at any time finite in extent though growing.

Now comes the sleight of hand. When we consider the internal, cosmic time of each observable universe, each can be traced back to an initial Big Bang event. We can now string together these various Big Bang events as occurring simultaneously. Big Bangs which will occur in the global future are now to be regarded as present. As a result, the infinite, temporal series of successive Big Bangs is converted into an infinite, spatial array of simultaneous Big Bangs. Hence, from the internal point of view there now exists an infinity of universes. As Vilenkin puts it, “The infinity of time in one view is thus transformed into the infinity of space in the other” (p. 99).

Vilenkin’s deft transformation seems to presuppose a static theory of time or, as it is sometimes called, four-dimensionalism or spacetime realism, according to which all spacetime points, whether past, present, or future, are equally real. For if temporal becoming is an objective feature of reality, as I have argued in my Time and Eternity (Crossway, 2001), then the global future is potentially infinite only, and future Big Bangs do not in any sense exist. If there is a global tide of becoming, then there is no actually infinite collection of Big Bangs after all. Internal observers, unaware of the global perspective, are simply mistaken in their taking the successive Big Bang events to be occurring simultaneously. This is a good illustration of how issues in the philosophy of time impinge crucially on scientific debates.

By postulating many worlds, Vilenkin can find purchase for the Anthropic Principle in order to explain away the fine-tuning of the universe. Quantum fluctuations in the scalar fields determine what sort of vacuum will decay out of the false vacuum, each associated with a different set of values for the constants of nature. By postulating an infinite array of island universes, randomly varying in their constants, Vilenkin can then appeal to the Anthropic Principle to explain away the observed fine-tuning: we can observe only a universe which is fine-tuned for our existence.

But if an infinite ensemble of simultaneous universes does not actually exist, Vilenkin’s attempt to explain away the fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life collapses. For if, in fact, an infinite array of universes does not yet exist, if most of them lie in the potentially infinite future and are therefore unreal, then there actually exist only as many observable universes as can have formed since any island’s origin in the finite past. Moreover, since Vilenkin himself has shown that the multiverse cannot be extended into the infinite past but must have had a beginning, there can be only as many island universes now in existence as have formed in the false vacuum since the multiverse’s beginning. Given the incomprehensible improbability of the constants’ all falling randomly into the life-permitting range, it may well be highly improbable that a life-permitting island universe should have decayed this soon out of the false vacuum. In that case the sting of fine-tuning has not been removed.

Vilenkin’s whole multiverse scenario depends in any case on the hypothesis of future-eternal inflation, which in turn is based upon the existence of certain primordial scalar fields which govern inflation. Although Vilenkin observes that “Inflation is eternal in practically all models suggested so far” (p. 214), he also admits, “Another important question is whether or not such scalar fields really exist in nature. Unfortunately, we don’t know. There is no direct evidence for their existence” (p. 61). This lack of evidence ought to temper our confidence in MWH.

Wholly apart from its speculative nature, however, the multiverse hypothesis faces a potentially lethal problem, which Vilenkin doesn’t even mention. Simply stated, if our universe is but one member of an infinite collection of randomly varying universes, then it’s overwhelmingly more probable that we should be observing a much different universe than that which we in fact observe. This same problem proved devastating for Ludwig Boltzmann’s appeal to a multiverse hypothesis in classical physics in order to explain why, if it has existed forever, the universe is not now in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium or heat death. Boltzmann made the bold speculation that the universe as a whole does, in fact, exist in a state of heat death, but that here and there random fluctuations produce pockets of disequilibrium, which Boltzmann referred to as “worlds.” Ours is one of these, and we shouldn’t be surprised to observe our world in such a highly improbable disequilibrium state, since observers cannot exist anywhere else. Boltzmann’s daring MWH has been universally rejected by contemporary physics on the grounds that were our universe but one such world in a multiverse, it is vastly more probable that we should be observing a much smaller region of disequilibrium—even one in which our solar system alone was produced in the twinkling of an eye by a random fluctuation—than what we do observe, since that is incomparably more probable than the whole universe’s being progressively formed by a decline in entropy from an equilibrium state.

Now a similar problem afflicts the contemporary appeal to the multiverse to explain away fine-tuning. Roger Penrose of Oxford University has calculated that the odds of our universe’s low entropy condition obtaining by chance alone are on the order of 1:1010(123), an inconceivable number. If our universe were but one member of a multiverse of randomly ordered worlds, then it is vastly more probable that we should be observing a much smaller universe. For example, the odds of our solar system’s being formed instantly by the random collision of particles is about 1:1010(60), a vast number, but inconceivably smaller than 1010(123). (Penrose calls it “utter chicken feed” by comparison [The Road to Reality (Knopf, 2005), pp. 762-5]). Or again, if our universe is but one member of a multiverse, then we ought to be observing highly extraordinary events, like horses’ popping into and out of existence by random collisions, or perpetual motion machines, since these are vastly more probable than all of nature’s constants and quantities’ falling by chance into the virtually infinitesimal life-permitting range. Observable universes like those strange worlds are simply much more plenteous in the ensemble of universes than worlds like ours and, therefore, ought to be observed by us if the universe were but a random member of a multiverse of worlds. Since we do not have such observations, that fact strongly disconfirms the multiverse hypothesis. On naturalism, at least, it is therefore highly probable that there is no multiverse.

All this has been said, of course, without asking whether the multiverse itself must not exhibit fine-tuning in order to exist. If it does, as some have argued, then it is a non-starter as an alternative to design.

The Universe, Design, and Fine Tuning

http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/cumulativecase.htm

The cosmological argument for God's existence attempts to argue to God's existence from the Universe, either from the fact that it has a beginning (Kalam cosmological argument) or from the mere fact that it exists, whether for infinite or finite time (non-Kalam cosmological argument). That anything should exist is exceedingly surprising. The contingency of the Universe cries out for explanation. But it may be thought that however improbable the Universe is, independent of a God hypothesis, theism does not lead us to expect any Universe at all. God's freedom suggests that a Universe is not probable. But whatever the limitations of such arguments, there are additional evidential considerations that are relevant to the prospects for constructing a good argument for God's existence. These evidential considerations involve specific features of the Universe, not simply its existence. The features in question are what can be referred to as the temporal regularities and fine-tuning of the Universe.



Temporal Regularities and Fine Tuning


The Universe is a complex physical system of material objects of varying sizes, shapes, and characteristics that are connected in space and time, and which behave and interact according to a relatively small number of physical laws. These physical laws mark important temporal regularities in the Universe. Moreover, these laws are themselves uniquely related to the emergence of life in the cosmos. The fine-tuning of the Universe refers to the widely held position (of many physicists, cosmologists, and philosophers) that the Universe's physical laws and boundary conditions are calibrated within a very narrow range so as to make the Universe conducive to life.

Strength of Forces and Mass of Elementary Particles
The fine-tuning of the Universe includes the claim that the constants of the laws of the Universe are such that if they had been slightly different, the Universe would not have been life conducive. More precisely, given the four fundamental forces and basic array of fundamental particles, these forces and particles must have particular values and ratios to each other, otherwise the Universe could not produce life at any stage of its evolutionary development.

If the strong nuclear force is increased by 2%, there would be no protons (and hence no atoms) or protons would be bound to diprotons so that stars would burn a billion times faster than the sun.
If the weak nuclear force is increased by 3.4%, then there would be no hydrogen in the Universe, for it would have all been converted into helium shortly after the Big Bang. (b) If the weak nuclear force were decreased by 9%, then there would no elements heavier than hydrogen (or possibly no hydrogen at all if neutrons did not decay into protons).
If electromagnetism were slightly increased or decreased, stars would be too cold or too hot. Gravity is 1039 weaker than electromagnetism. If it were 1033 weaker, stars would be a billion times less massive and burn a million times faster.
Stable nucleides, essential to all biology and chemistry, require neutron-proton mass difference to be about twice the electron's mass (otherwise neutrons would all be turned into protons or vice-versa).
How are these points significant for the evolution of life in the Universe?

The only likely form of life in a Universe such as ours is carbon-based life. Carbon compounds are very stable over long periods of time, and (along with hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen) can form long complex molecule chains. Carbon can enter into various chemical combinations and is able to store more information than any other element. This is particularly important with respect to reproduction, since self-replicating molecules are needed that can contain and transmit genetic coding. Nucleic acids perform this task, and they are built up from carbon entering into combinations with hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen.

Hence, the relationships here may be schematically represented as follows:

life => carbon => stable and massive stars => hydrogen atoms

The fine-tuning facts above are all crucial to the existence of carbon in the Universe, and the successful combination of carbon with other elements to produce DNA. DNA requires stable nucleides, and without DNA there is no reproduction and hence no life. Carbon is produced in stars, specifically in stable, massive stars. Their thermonuclear processes produce carbon and the heavier elements, eventually blowing these out into space when the star dies a violent death in a supernova. Changes in electromagnetism would negatively impact the sort of stars that would exist. If slightly increased most stars would spend 90-95% of their life as cooler red stars, unable to produce the heavier elements and encourage the evolution of life. If slightly decreased, the life of all stars would be relatively short lived and spent mostly as very hot blue stars. Similarly, if gravity (1039 weaker than electromagnetism) were 1033 weaker than electromagnetism, then stars would not have stable long lives, something that would surely constitute an obstacle for the evolution of life in planetary systems. A slight reduction of weak nuclear force would have meant a Universe with no elements heavier than hydrogen, thereby eliminating carbon. A slight increase in the weak nuclear force would have meant the elimination of hydrogen atoms altogether shortly after the Big Bang. Hence, there would have been no stars at all. A slight increase in the strong nuclear force would have meant the elimination of protons and hence all atoms.

Hence, the preconditions for life in the Universe depend on finely calibrated laws.

B. Boundary Conditions

Given the actual laws of nature (or laws relatively close to them), the boundary conditions of the Universe must lie within a very narrow range.

What are boundary conditions?

Boundary conditions refer to those factors in the Universe that determine the possible states of the Universe in its history, whether for finite or infinite time.

If the Universe had a beginning, boundary conditions would be the arrangements and properties of the stuff of the Universe when it began. If the Universe had no beginning, its boundary conditions would be the arrangement and properties of the stuff of the Universe at any given time that determine the Universe's past and future states. If the Universe began with a singularity (as the standard Big Bang model suggests), conditions at the moment of the Big Bang must have values that lie within a very narrow range if the Universe was to be life conducive.

If the velocity of expansion were one part in a million greater than its actual value, then no stars or heavier elements would form.
If the velocity of expansion were one part in a million, million greater than its actual value, then the Universe would have collapsed before it was cool enough to form the elements.
Hence, the boundary conditions given an expanding Universe from a singularity are calibrated just so as to yield a Universe with the right conditions for the emergence of life.

Of course, if the Universe is infinitely old, then the boundary conditions will, at any given time, be those factors that determine all past and future states of the Universe. It is certainly possible that these conditions would be such as to require the Universe to exhaust all logically possible states of energy-matter. And if so, then the Universe is bound eventually to produce the right sorts of conditions for life and life itself. However, it is doubtful that the Universe is infinitely old, and even if it were, some sort of principle of conservation of energy will place significant constraints of what states such a Universe could pass through. They would probably be limited to rearrangements of the energy-matter at any given time. But a Universe that is temporally infinite is surely one in which the emergence of life is more likely than one that is temporally finite, for the former provides more time for the requisite arrangements of energy-matter.

For further reference on fine-tuning:

These observations on fine tuning are discussed in detail by John Leslie, "Anthropic Principle, World Ensemble, Design," American Philosophical Quarterly 19:141-151 (1982), "How to Draw Conclusions from a Finely-Tuned Universe" in Physics, Philosophy, and Theology, ed. Russell, Stoeger, and Coyne (Vatican Observatory Foundation, 1988), and J.D. Barrow and F.J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Clarendon Press, 1986), Richard Swinburne, "Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe" in Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. John Lesie (Promethius Books, 1998).

II. The Evidential Force of Temporal Regularities and Fine Tuning

Do these bits of evidence support the existence of God? And if so, how well?

Recall the following with respect to inductive or probabilistic reasoning in the form of inference to best explanation. A body of evidence e supports or confirms some hypothesis h to the extent to which (i) h leads us to expect e and (ii) e is otherwise inexplicable (e.g., other hypotheses do not lead us to expect e). Furthermore, we may add that (iii) when competing hypotheses both lead us to expect e, the simpler hypothesis is more likely to be true. In certain cases, (iv) fit with background knowledge is also important. (See below).

I will combine temporal regularity and fine-tuning into a single category, significant cosmic order, O. Let G, then, refer to the claim that there is a God, i.e., an immaterial, eternal, perfectly free, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good being. O will support G to the extent to which G is a simple hypothesis that leads us to expect O, and where O is otherwise inexplicable or there are no alternative hypotheses that would lead us to expect O.

A. Does Theism Lead Us to Expect O?

Although theism may not lead us to expect any Universe at all (assuming that God is a perfectly free being), theism does lead us to expect O.

The Universe exhibits many good states of affairs. Some of these, symmetry and beauty, are directly the result of O. But many others are indirectly related to O. The temporal regularities and fine-tuning of the Universe are necessary preconditions for the emergence of life, especially intelligent life. The existence of living organisms, especially intelligent ones that are conscious, free, and have the power to act on their world in various ways is presumably a good thing. It is a good thing to be living (as opposed to non-living), conscious (as opposed to unconscious), to acquire knowledge (as opposed to being ignorant), and to act on the world by deliberate choice (as opposed to being a preprogrammed robot). But these goods are not possible without O. Furthermore, intelligent beings will be able to appreciate O or the beauty of the cosmos generated by O, and this is itself a good thing.

Does theism lead us to expect O? Yes, to the extent to which theism leads us to expect that, if there is a Universe at all, it will be one that exhibits many good states of affairs. First, God being all-powerful is able to bring about all these states and their prerequisites. Second, being all knowing, God would know exactly how to bring them about. Third, being all good, he has overriding reason to bring about these states. A good being will seek to bring about good states and not bring about bad states, and if the being is perfectly free, nothing will hinder Him from doing so. Hence, it is quite likely that, if God willed to create a Universe, that he would create one that exhibited the variety of intrinsic and instrumental goods exhibited in our Universe.

He would create a beautiful world, and orderly world is beautiful, whereas a chaotic world is ugly. The Universe is a theatre of great beauty: the movements planets around stars, the variety of stars, the billions of galaxies, each full of hundreds of billions of such stellar variety, vast cosmic regions of gaseous nebulae that glow with lovely colors and shapes. Then there is the evolution of this entire complex physical system itself from an initial subatomic particle to the formation of stars and galaxies stretching out over 10 to 15 billions years, as well as the process of biological evolution on at least our own planet and perhaps many others, a process of amazing ingenuity whereby nature itself brings forth a plethora of living beings. Even if there were no other beings to perceive this beauty other than God himself, it would still be a good thing.
But God would have good reason to create a Universe with living beings that are conscious and can learn and perform intentional actions. These are good states and animals exemplify these states. They have mental lives and experience pleasant sensations. The temporal regularities of the world allow them to learn and act on the basis of their knowledge.
But God would have an overriding reason to create human beings with a unique mental life, self-consciousness, and the ability to acquire knowledge and to freely choose and act on the basis of our knowledge, so as to bring about calculated effects. In this he would be making beings very much like himself. Furthermore, he would have good reason to make them with bodies. Embodied intelligent beings have a close relationship to their environment, are able to control their bodies and learn through the use of their body, and experience pleasant sensations. In this way, human beings, and other intelligent beings like us elsewhere in the Universe (if there be others like us) share in the creative likeness of their maker. God's generosity strong suggests that He would want to share these very qualities with other beings. And since there being actualized depends on the existence of temporal regularities, God has good reason to create a Universe that operates according to physical laws.
(1)-(3) are points made by Swinburne in Is there a God?

Is O otherwise Inexplicable?
1. Chance?

It should first be noted that given our background knowledge (the knowledge about the world we bring to this question), O is indeed very improbable. It is often argued a priori that since there are more ways a system can be disordered than ordered, a Universe with significant order is indeed a priori unlikely. O certainly ranks in the category of significant cosmic order. Surely there are far more less interesting ways the Universe could have turned out. There are far more possible histories of the cosmos in which it is full of black holes, has no stars, is short-lived, or produces no life at all. Suppose we were to write down on separate pieces of paper all of the possible non-O-Universes (perhaps labeling them with blue marks), and do the same with all O-Universes (labeling them with red marks). If there are vastly more non-O-Universes than O-Universes, then a random draw is more likely to turn up a piece of paper labeled with a blue mark. The greater the number of blue labeled pieces and the fewer red labeled ones, the more inadequate an appeal to chance becomes to "explain" why a piece of paper with red labeling turned up on the first draw. The evidence of fine-tuning implies that the order exhibited in our Universe is striking. It is significant. O is quite unlikely if left wholly to chance.

Of course, fine-tuning does not say that life could not have arisen in other ways, that the actual laws and boundary conditions are necessary for life to emerge in any Universe. A slight variation in the actual laws and boundary conditions would negate the possibility of life, but change the laws and boundary conditions altogether and you could easily get other mechanisms or processes that would lead to the evolution of life, intelligent and otherwise, in a different sort of Universe. An O-Universe could exist with laws and boundary conditions very different from the ones in our Universe. But this does not show that the emergence of life, or a life conducive Universe, is not a special of unique phenomenon, nor does it in anyway reduce the a priori unlikely character of a Universe such as ours. For whatever set of laws or boundary conditions one selects which are conducive to the evolution of life, fine-tuning implies that slight variations in those laws and boundary conditions will foreclose the possibility of life emerging in those other systems. John Leslie used the example of a randomly thrown dart hitting a cherry hanging on a wall surrounded by a huge cherry-less region. This is no less surprising if there happen to be a handful of cherries in the neighborhood, even if they were scattered about at great distances on the same wall. Anyone who has tried to win a prize at a carnival by hitting a particular object with a dart, land a penny in a glass, or land a small ring around the top of milk bottle understands just how impressive the existence of an O-Universe is.

2. A Temporally Infinite Universe or Infinite Succession of Universes?

It might be argued that the probability of O is increased by postulating a single Universe that is temporally infinite or an infinite series of Universes following one after the other, a series of big bangs and expansions and then contractions ending in big crunches. After all, the likelihood of drawing a red labeled paper from the hat (in the above example) increases with the number of draws one gets, though the exact probabilities here depend on the exact number of blue to red ones and how many draws one gets. And someone eventually takes home the stuffed bear or lion at a carnival after hundreds or players have tossed in a good deal of money on the game.

As stated above, it seems plausible to suppose (setting aside certain qualifications arising from boundary condition constraints) that a Universe that is temporally infinite will likely throw up sufficient number of variations in its arrangements or energy-matter to make O more likely than if we simply assumed a temporally finite Universe of 10-15 billion years. Just how likely is another question though. But suppose the probability of O given a temporally infinite Universe was just as high as the probability of O given theism. Our background knowledge would reduce the plausibility of any infinite Universe theory. For instance, the second law of thermodynamics (according to heat is prevented to flow from cold bodies to hot ones, but is allowed to flow from hot bodies to cold ones) implies that the Universe is moving toward increased entropy or disorder. The principle is that all systems have a built in tendency toward increased entropy. But if the Universe is temporally infinite, it would have reached a stage of maximum entropy a finite time ago. But clearly it hasn't. So the Universe cannot be infinite in age. Also, the background radiation that bathes the Universe (confirming Big Bang cosmology) is somewhat of an anomaly in an infinitely old Universe. These were both problems for the modern version of an infinitely old Universe, the Steady State theory of Fred Hoyle.

An alternative view would be the so-called Oscillating Universe theory, according to which the present Universe was preceded by a prior Universe that collapsed. Hence, the Big Bang (of the present Universe) was the result of a Big Crunch (of a prior Universe). Would not O be likely given an infinite series of expansion-contraction phases of various Universe's, each with its own boundary conditions and laws? It seems that eventually there will be a Universe like ours in which life evolves because just the right conditions are finally satisfied. Perhaps so, if this hypothesis were otherwise plausible. But current physics and cosmology finds it unacceptable. First, the Universe must have sufficient mass for expansion to halt and initiate a collapse. At present, it is still unknown as to whether it has the critical mass. Secondly, any collapse would have to bounce back into an expansion phase before reaching a singularity (for nothing could come out of a Universe that collapses into a singularity). But there is no known repulsive law of physics strong enough to prevent the Universe from collapsing into a singularity and bounce the Universe back into an expansion phase.

Hence, neither of these views seems plausible as candidates for making O probable. This is not primarily because they don't make O probable (though that is itself controversial), but because they do no fit well with background knowledge. Moreover, one may equally question their overall simplicity as well.

III. Theism and the Many Worlds Hypothesis

A third possibility would be to postulate an infinite number of Universes. If there are an infinite number of Universes, and between them all logically possible states of energy-matter are exhausted, then it is highly likely, if not certain, that one of them will exhibit the conditions needed for life. It is highly probable, if not certain, that one of them will be an O-Universe. Compare. Although we may express surprise at the ten expert marksmen who all simultaneously miss the same target 30 feet away, we will not be surprised if this shooting test was conducted with the same ten men over a million times. Indeed, if there were an infinite number of such events, we'd be inclined to say that eventually there would be an event in which they all miss the target. As indicated above, the vastly improbable does happen sometimes given a large enough collection of events or instances.

This is perhaps the best rival hypothesis to theism to explain O. Like the rivals above, it certainly seems to increase the likelihood of O to at least equal that of theism. But unlike the other suggestions above, it does not necessarily come into conflict with any obvious background knowledge. What needs some degree of clarification though is the idea of a "distinct" Universe.

A. Spatially and Temporally Multiple Universes

Some take our Universe to be the observable Universe, or what will be at some point observable to us. Other worlds would, then, be spatially removed from our observable region of space. Although it plausible to suppose that there are other worlds in this sense, it seems highly unlikely that these other regions of space would different significantly from the observable Universe with respect to their fundamental laws and boundary conditions. First, these other regions remain causally connected to our own Universe, and this is reason good to suppose that these other regions possess the same fundamental laws and boundary conditions. Otherwise, it would be difficult see what it would mean for them to be connected to our space. Secondly, if they are causally connected to us we could in principle have knowledge of them. But we could not acquire any knowledge of these other regions unless we assumed that similar laws obtained there. In other terms, the hypothesis of there being other universes with different laws cannot be falsified, for this would itself presuppose that those regions of space have the same fundamental laws as our own, or at least some of the same ones. Otherwise, we could make no sense of any data coming to us from them. So the inability in principle even to acquire knowledge about these other Universes implies that they are not causally connected to our own, but then they are distinct in some sense other than simply being removed spatially from our region of the Universe. Third, the observable isotropy of the Universe suggests that other distant regions of space have the same arrangement of matter-energy, though in principle we could discover that things were different in distant regions. Distant regions of the Universe, observed through telescopes, are roughly the same in their basic features whether viewed in the southern or northern sky. It seems reasonable to suppose that what is presently unobservable is like this too, given that successive new observations continue to conform to the isotropy thesis.

Hence, if we treat spatially distinct regions of the Universe as distinct Universes they most likely have the same fundamental laws and boundary conditions of our Universe, and so subject to same fine-tuning argument as our own Universe. Put slightly differently, if the other Universes do not have different laws and boundary conditions, the Many Worlds Hypothesis loses its force. It is only by postulating a variety of Universes that differ with respect to their laws and boundary conditions that one increases the probability that one of them will have the prerequisites for life. Moreover, the same sort of argument will hold if we treat temporally distant parts of our Universe as different Universes. For instance, any evidence we have to the effect that there once was such a Universe would be that it provides a good explanation for the Universe's existence today, but that involves a commitment to the notion that the past and present Universes are causally connected. They would have to have to the same fundamental laws and boundary conditions. Big Bang cosmology, for example, allows us postulate a time in the very distant past time, at 10-43 sec. of the Universe's existence, when the Universe was no larger than a sub-atomic particle - very different from the Universe for most of its history. But this "quantum Universe" would operate according to quantum laws, which are applicable at later times at the quantum level. And our only reason for supposing that such a Universe existed then is that it explains how the macro Universe evolved. But this presupposes that the micro and macro Universes are causally connected to each other, and so involve the same fundamental laws and boundary conditions. (Similar results would follow with respect to Universes temporally removed into the future).

It would seem advantageous to the Many Worlds Hypothesis that the other Universes be defined in such a way that they are not causally connected to our own Universe. If this is not the case then it would seem that the other Universes would not vary considerably from our own, at least not with respect to fundamental laws and boundary conditions. The causal connections that are retained between merely spatially removed or temporally removed regions of our Universe undermines the idea that these worlds would be different in their fundamental features, and that point undermines the point to the Many Worlds Hypothesis, namely to increase the probability of O without appealing to theism.

B. Simplicity and the Many Worlds Hypothesis

But the postulation of many worlds not spatially (or temporally) related to our own seems to be a very complex theory for which there is little evidence (and no evidence other than that it would lead us to expect O). The Many Worlds Hypothesis offers an alternative hypothesis to explain O. It does not deny that theism explains O. It merely points out that there is some other hypothesis, consistent with there being no God, that explains O equally well.

Here it is important to remember that the probability of a hypothesis given certain evidence is not merely determined by the extent to which the hypothesis leads us to expect the evidence or observation in question, but also on the simplicity of the postulated hypothesis. When two hypotheses each leads us to expect what we observe, the simpler hypothesis is more likely to be true. Theism is simpler than the Many Worlds hypothesis on two counts. First, theism postulates only a single being, not many entities, let alone an infinite number of entities. It is far simpler to postulate a single entity to explain one other entity than to postulate many or an infinite number of entities to explain one. Secondly, in theism the being postulated is itself very simple. Theism postulates a being with unlimited power, knowledge, and freedom. If theism were to postulate a being with only limited power or knowledge, the question would arise as to why the being had just that amount of power and knowledge and not more. Some other cause or condition must be assumed to account for the fact that the being is limited in the way that it is. Hence, a hypothesis involving a being with finite capacities is less simple than a hypothesis than involves a being with unlimited capacities, for in the latter case there is no implicit commitment to the existence of additional conditions or causes.

For this reason, "zero" and "infinity" is each a simple state. This explains their frequency in science. According to Newtonian physics gravitational force travels with infinite velocity, even though a finite number here would have had the same predictive power. In the medieval period, people believed that light traveled with an infinite velocity. Of course, both of these assumptions were in fact incorrect, but they were not rejected until alternative hypotheses permitted greater predictive power. Similarly, photons are said to have zero mass when stationary, as opposed to some finite value, though both would be equally useful in making successful predictions.

Now the Many Worlds Hypothesis fails to equal the simplicity of theism on two counts. One postulates either trillions or an endless number of entities instead of one, so it is quantitatively more complex than theism. Furthermore, even if we suppose that an infinite number of Universes is simpler than a finite number of Universes and at least as simple as a single being, it is what this infinity modifies that creates problems. For although there is no limit to the number of Universes if there is an infinite number of them, each Universe raises independent questions of complexity, which is not avoided when they are considered collectively under the category of an "infinite" number. Most of them will be limited in various ways as spatial-physical systems and consist of various bits and chunks of matter and operate according to various laws. Many of the vast number of Universes postulated in the Many Worlds hypothesis will be ontologically complex due to their spatial and temporal extension, as well as their ontological constitution of matter-energy, laws, and boundary conditions. So determining simplicity requires that one consider the sort of entities being considered, as well as the number of them. Theism comes out in far better shape given this criterion of simplicity.

As Swinburne writes:

The postulation of the actual existence of an infinite number of worlds, between them exhausting all the logical possibilities, many of them consisting of an infinite quantity of matter-energy behaving in accord with simple laws over infinite time, which are not caused by anything else, which do not, which do not causally affect each other, but which between them exhaust the logical space without any one being qualitatively identical to any other, is to postulate complexity and non-prearranged coincidence of infinite dimensions beyond rational belief. ("Argument for the Fine-Tuning of the Universe," in Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, p. 178)

Also, even if the Many Worlds hypothesis and theism were equally simple, theism would still have an explanatory advantage. Although each hypothesis would lead us to expect an O-Universe, the Many Worlds hypothesis would still leave the existence of an infinite number of worlds a brute fact. But surely this will be just as mysterious as the existence of one world, if not more so. Theism has the ability to explain this fact. Hence, when the evidence in question includes the very existence of the Universe, or an infinite number of them, since such states of affairs are highly unlikely in themselves, theism has the power to explain to some degree. What is otherwise inexplicable can be made explicable by the theistic hypothesis.

C. The Range of Many Worlds

Also, it would seem that the infinite number of Universes must either range over all logical possibilities or not. If not, then a question arises as to whether an infinite number of Universes would inevitably contain one that is life conducive. If the Universes exhaust logical possibilities, surely this is inevitable. But if they do not exhaust all logical possibilities one would have to guarantee enough diversity between these Universes to make a life conducive Universe likely, while putting some sort of limit on what these worlds could be like. But the limit would have to be something other than logical possibility, and it looks like all such limitations would be highly arbitrary. After all, why should each of the other Universes be significantly different from ours? But if the Universes exhaust all logical possibilities, then theism is ultimately unavoidable. One logical possibility is that God created all the Universes. So if the Universes exhaust logical possibilities, they would all have to be created by God. In fact, this follows simply from God being the creator of one of the many Universes, if we take God's necessity to be logical. If there is a single Universe, from among the infinite number of Universes, that is created by God as a logically necessary being (certainly a logical possibility), then every one of the infinite number of Universes will be created by God. A logically necessary being exists in all possible worlds, so since the infinite number of worlds represents the actualization of all possible worlds (since they exhaust what is logically possible), God must be the creator of all of them.

Hence, the Many Worlds hypothesis that allows logical possibility to determine the range of variation among worlds creates an interesting paradox. It certainly entails the existence of a Universe with temporal regularities and fine-tuning, but it also entails the existence of God! Avoiding this seems to require an arbitrary restriction on the variation of the infinite number of Universes.



IV. Final Thoughts

A. The Anthropic Principle

There is one additional argument that might be used to reduce the plausibility of the theistic argument from temporal regularities and fine-tuning. This is the so-called anthropic principle, or more specifically a particular interpretation of the anthropic principle. This principle states that the laws and boundary conditions must be the way they are, otherwise no one would be present in the Universe to observe the fact. The particular interpretation of this that is relevant here is the notion that since we would not be here to observe things if there were no order, then the fact that there is order is not very surprising. We could observe nothing else!

The answer to this is quite simple. Although it is certainly true that we would not be present to observe a Universe that lacks the prerequisites for life, a Universe with significant disorder, it hardly follows that the order that exists is not surprising. The objection here is analogous to the following. If 100 marksmen aim at a prisoner to execute him, and they all fire simultaneously and miss, surely the prisoner could say, "I would not be able to make this observation that 'they all missed me' if they had not missed." In other words, "I am able to make this observation only because they missed." Yes indeed. But it seems absurd to suppose that this fact undermines the need to find an explanation for the fact that the marksmen did in fact miss. Naturally the prisoner could not have observed anything but what he observed, but his observation still demands some sort of explanation. The argument from temporal regularity and fine-tuning does not depend ultimately on the fact that we observe order, but that the order is there, independent of us. So this objection, based on the anthropic principle, is not a good one to undermine a theistic argument from temporal order and fine-tuning.

B. Summarizing the Argument

A theistic argument following the pattern of inference to best explanation properly depends on (at least) three relevant bits of evidence: (e1) the existence of the Universe, (e2) the temporal regularities of the Universe, and (e3) the fine-tuning of the Universe. Theism is made probable by e1,…,e3 to the extent to which theism is a simple hypothesis that leads us to expect e1,…,e3, and e1,…,e3 is not otherwise to be expected. The claim here is with respect to theism these conditions are satisfied, and thus that there is a significant likelihood of there being a God given e1,…,e3.

Alternate explanations of e1,…,e3 are inadequate.

Chance does not lead us to expect e1,…,e3.
A temporally infinite universe, or infinite succession of universes, might lead us to expect e2 and e3, but neither would lead us to expect e1, and neither would fit with our relevant background knowledge (in the area of physics and cosmology).
The Many Worlds hypothesis leads us to expect e2 and e3, but not e1. But it is a more complex hypothesis than theism. Furthermore, too many constraints on the range of diversity of worlds reduces the probability of e2 and e3, but too few constraints open the way for theism, as for instance if logical possibility determines the range of worlds, for a world created by God is one such logical possibility.