The fine-tuned Universe is the idea that the conditions that allow life in the Universe can only occur when certain universal physical constants lie within a very narrow range, so that if any of several fundamental constants were only slightly different the universe would be unlikely to be conducive to the establishment and development of matter, astronomical structures, elemental diversity, or life as it is presently understood

In theoretical physics, fine-tuning refers to circumstances when the parameters of a model must be adjusted very precisely in order to agree with observations. Theories requiring fine-tuning are regarded as problematic in the absence of a known mechanism to explain why the parameters happen to have precisely the needed values. Explanations often invoked to resolve fine-tuning problems include natural mechanisms by which the values of the parameters may be constrained to their observed values, and the anthropic principle.
The necessity of fine-tuning leads to various problems that do not show that the theories are incorrect, in the sense of falsifying observations, but nevertheless indicate that a piece of the story is missing. For example, the cosmological constant problem (why is the cosmological constant so small?); the hierarchy problem; the strong CP problem, and others.
An example of a fine-tuning problem considered by the scientific community to have a plausible "natural" solution is the cosmological flatness problem, which is solved if inflationary theory is correct: inflation forces the universe to become very flat, answering the question of why the universe is today observed to be flat to such a high degree.

In physics and cosmology, the anthropic principle is the collective name for several ways of asserting that physical and chemical theories, especially astrophysics and cosmology, need to take into account that there is life on Earth, and that one form of that life, Homo sapiens, has attained rationality. The only kind of universe humans can occupy is one that is similar to the current one.
Originally proposed as a rule of reasoning, the term has since been extended to cover supposed "superlaws" that in various ways require the universe to support intelligent life, usually assumed to be carbon-based and occasionally asserted to be human beings. Anthropic reasoning assesses these constraints by analyzing the properties of hypothetical universes whose fundamental parameters or laws of physics differ from those of the real universe. Anthropic reasoning typically concludes that the stability of structures essential for life, from atomic nuclei to the whole universe, depends on delicate balances between different fundamental forces. These balances are believed to occur only in a tiny fraction of possible universes — so that this universe appears fine-tuned for life. Anthropic reasoning attempts to explain and quantify this fine tuning. Within the scientific community the usual approach is to invoke selection effects and to hypothesize an ensemble of alternate universes, in which case that which can be observed is subject to an anthropic bias.
The term anthropic in "anthropic principle" has been argued to be a misnomer. While singling out our kind of carbon-based life, none of the coincidences require human life or demand that carbon-based life develop intelligence.[1][2]
The anthropic principle has given rise to some confusion and controversy, partly because the phrase has been applied to several distinct ideas. All versions of the principle have been accused of undermining the search for a deeper physical understanding of the universe. Those who invoke the anthropic principle often invoke multiple universes or an intelligent designer, both controversial and criticised for being untestable and therefore outside the purview of accepted science.

I think your intuitions on this matter are basically correct, Ken. I’d commend to you the work of Robin Collins, who is probably the best thinker working on these questions. I’ll include a list of references at the end of this answer. In order to calculate the probability of a constant’s being such that it leads to a life-supporting universe, we need to calculate the ratio between the range of life-permitting values and the range of values it might have, whether life-permitting or not. We can assess the range of life-permitting values by holding the laws of nature constant while altering the value of the constant which plays a role in that law. So, for example, we can figure out what would happen if we decrease or increase the force of gravity, and we discover that alterations beyond a certain range would result either in large-scale objects’ ceasing to stick together or else collapsing. That will give us an idea of the range of strength of the gravitational force that is compatible with physical life forms.

Then we compare that range with the range of values that the constant could have assumed. This is trickier, but a simple rule of thumb is to take the range to be as wide as we can see that such values are possible. There may be values that a constant could have which lie outside our ken, but so long as the range that we can see is large in comparison to the life-permitting range, then that constant’s having the value it does is improbable. For some of the constants, like the cosmological constant, the range of life permitting values is incomprehensibly tiny in comparison with the range of values we see that it could have, so that the chances of the constant’s having the value it does is virtually next to impossible.

The range itself is not fine-tuned. Rather it is the individual constant that is fine-tuned, that is to say, in order for the universe to be life-permitting the constant must fall into a very narrow life-permitting range in comparison to the range of values it could have assumed.

You’re right that detractors of design have been forced to resort to the extraordinary Many Worlds Hypothesis in an effort to explain away fine-tuning. If there is a World Ensemble of universes which are infinite in number and varying randomly in their constants and initial conditions, then by chance alone a life-permitting universe will appear in the ensemble, indeed, it will appear an infinite number of times.

Now this recourse to the World Ensemble will be in vain if it turns out that the mechanism that generates the World Ensemble must itself be fine-tuned, for then one has only kicked the problem upstairs. And, indeed, that does seem to be the case. The most popular candidate for a World Ensemble today, the inflationary multiverse, does appear to require fine-tuning. For example, M-theory, the theory which supposedly governs the multiverse, works only if there are exactly eleven dimensions—but it does nothing to explain why precisely that number of dimensions should exist.

So when your teachers or classmates pull the multiverse out of the bag, just ask them, “Isn’t the multiverse itself describable by specific physical laws? Don’t those laws themselves include constants and boundary conditions which must be fine-tuned in order for the multiverse to exist?’” It will be interesting to hear their reply!

In his best- selling book A Brief History of Time, Hawking writes:

"The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been finely adjusted to make possible the development of life. For example if the electric charge of the electron had been only slightly different, stars would have been unable to burn hydrogen and helium , or else they would not have exploded." [A Brief History of Time, p. 125] A minor difference in the electron's charge and stars wouldn't burn. There would be no burning sun at the centre of our solar system to provide life-supporting heat and light. Also there would be no supernova explosions to produce the raw materials for the formation of planets like our earth." [Ferguson, p. 94]

In 1973, astronomer and cosmologist Brandon Carter (Carter 1974) delivered a lecture in which he announced an exciting new discovery: the fundamental constants of the physical world must have been very delicately fine-tuned in order to make life possible. Since that time, literally dozens of such remarkable coincidences have been discovered, the so-called "anthropic coincidences". ("Anthropic" is a Greek word meaning "tending to bring about the existence of human beings.")

Science tells us that life-prohibiting universes are vastly more probable that life-permitting universes. Scientists have identified over 70 physical constants that must be fine-tuned to an incredible degree for life to exist. This is one reason why I believe in a Creator. This video discusses this rationale in brief while addressing some of the objections that skeptics raise.

In one of my most popular videos, I discussed the cosmic fine-tuning in the universe and how this indicates that the universe was designed. Naturally, this video drew a lot of responses. Many of these responses were rather foolish (e.g. "Evolution can explain the fine-tuning of the universe!" or "The universe is HUGE! That explains it all"). Some of the challenges raised were much more substantial though, and not so easily dismissed.

In this video, I offer my answers to these more thought-provoking challenges. I kinda enjoy this. I don't care much for "discussion" where respondents simply sling mud or don't make a real attempt to understand the issues. That's just a huge waste of time, and unlike some people, I don't live on the Internet.

However, when people (especially skeptics!) pose careful, thought-provoking challenges in a respectful way, then I welcome such discussion. I wish I had the time to respond to them much more frequently, but I'm glad for these opportunities nonetheless.

Did the universe come about solely through chance and natural processes? Or was it designed to be hospitable to life?

One of the most compelling evidences for the idea of cosmological intelligent design is the fact that the universe is finely tuned. In other words, the universe's physical constants are precisely the right values that are needed in order to sustain life.

Consider the gravitational force constant, G. If you have taken a physics course, you may remember a familiar equation for gravitational force: F = G * m1 * m2 / r^2, where G = 6.67 * 10^-11. If G were slightly tweaked, complex life could not exist.

Other examples of finely tuned parameters are the strong nuclear force constant, weak nuclear force constant, electromagnetic force constant, and ratio of electron to proton mass. If these parameters were even slightly smaller or slightly larger, chemistry (as we know it) would not be possible, and molecules would probably not even exist. It would be almost impossible for life of any kind to be sustained in these conditions.

There are three possible explanations for this extraordinary universal fine-tuning: 1) there exists an underlying mechanism that correctly sets these parameters; 2) it happened by sheer luck; 3) it happened by intelligent design.

A January 2006 Nature article titled “Our Universe: Outrageous Fortune” highlights a shift in sentiment among scientists regarding the cause of this fine-tuning. According to the article, “[s]tring theorists and cosmologists are increasingly turning to dumb luck as an explanation” since the search for an underlying mechanism for fine-tuning has been unfruitful.

However, the probability of randomly selecting the correct values for these parameters is so infinitesimally small that it is unreasonable to think that sheer luck alone can be the explanation for cosmological fine-tuning.

In order to increase the probabilistic resources, some scientists have been driven to suggest that there exist millions of universes that are parallel to our own universe but have different laws and constants. Even though the probability of fine-tuning is astronomically low, a fine-tuned universe could hypothetical emerge if chance has an enormous ensemble of universes at its disposal.

In reality, this concept of a multiverse is a metaphysical postulate, since only one universe is scientifically observable, and that universe is our own. The hypothetical existence of millions of universes must be assumed by faith. Charles Townes, a Nobel Laureate in Physics, suggests that the entire postulate is fantastic:

“Some scientists argue that ‘well, there's an enormous number of universes and each one is a little different. This one just happened to turn out right.' Well, that's a postulate, and it's a pretty fantastic postulate — it assumes there really are an enormous number of universes and that the laws could be different for each of them. The other possibility is that ours was planned, and that's why it has come out so specially” (UCBerkeleyNews interview, June 2005).

Scientists have not found an underlying mechanism that can explain fine-tuning. Sheer luck cannot be invoked without assuming the metaphysical concept of the existence of millions of universes. The only other alternative is cosmological intelligent design, which is the idea that a Designer has intelligently calibrated the constants in order to sustain life.

A critic may ask, “Doesn't intelligent design appeal to a metaphysical cause?” Actually, the concept of intelligent design is no more metaphysical than the hypothetical concept that millions of universes exist. And Ockham's Razor would favor intelligent design over the concept of an elaborate multiverse, since intelligent design is more direct as an explanation.

If one accepts that this physical universe had a beginning, then one is forced to appeal to a metaphysical cause. For how can there be any physical explanation for the origin of the physical universe?

In addition to the fine-tuning of constants, another positive evidence for cosmological intelligent design is the simplicity and beauty of the physics equations themselves. Einstein once said:

"The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is comprehensible."

This simplicity and comprehensibility of physical laws suggests that the universe is more than just a mere fluke of nature, since we would not expect sheer luck to produce mathematically elegant and simple laws.

From the current amount of scientific evidence, we can reliably infer that cosmological intelligent design is the most rational explanation for fine-tuning in the universe. Let's be grateful, for without fine-tuning, we would not exist.

Unlike a God-of-the-gaps argument, the argument for fine-tuning uses science without divine action to reveal the impeccable precision of our Universe. Fine-tuning is described in terms of physical constants and the initial conditions of our universe. Fine-tuning does not try to draw attention to where science has failed, but rather emphasizes how science has revealed the intricate balance of the universe.

One might argue that science could potentially explain the origins of these delicately balanced features, but there are two important things to keep in mind. First, it is very unlikely that a scientific theory could explain away the improbabilities of our Universe without raising other improbabilities. Second, an argument for fine-tuning is unlike a God-of-the-gaps argument in that it is not intended to prove God’s existence. While it is true that the fine-tuning of the Universe adds credence to belief in a creator, such recent scientific findings could hardly be called upon as the basis or justification of the long history of theistic belief. While the fine-tuning of the Universe does indeed lead many people to consider the possibility of God’s existence, the fact that science cannot disprove God’s existence assures us that it also cannot prove it. Instead, fine-tuning can be understood as a feature of the universe that is accordant with belief in a creator. A deeper scientific explanation of these features — albeit highly unlikely — would not ruin its usefulness as a pointer to God.

http://www.geocities.com/capecanaveral/lab/6562/apologetics/cosmoconstant.html

The recent Nature study popularized in the press regarding the nature of the universe has confirmed some of the original studies involving supernovae type 1.1 The supernovae results suggested that there was a "springiness" to space, called the "cosmological constant," that causes the universe to expand at a faster rate the more it has expanded. Often described as an "anti-gravity" force, it doesn't really oppose matter, but only affects matter as it is associated with the fabric of space.

The balloon-borne microwave telescope (called "Boomerang") examined the cosmic background radiation left over from the Big Bang.2 The angular power spectrum showed a peak value at exactly the value predicted by the inflationary hot Big Bang model dominated by cold dark matter. This model predicts a smaller second peak, which seems to be there, but cannot be fully resolved with the initial measurements. The presence of the second peak would all but seal the reliability of the Big Bang model as the mechanism by which the universe came into existence.

How does this study impact the Christian faith? The Bible says that the universe was created in finite time from that which is not visible.3 In addition, the Bible describes an expanding universe model. The Bible describes the Creator being personally involved in the design of the universe, so that we would expect to see this kind of design in His creation.4

How does this discovery impact atheists? Those who favor naturalism had long sought to find the simplest explanation for the universe, hoping to avoid any evidence for design. A Big Bang model in which there was just enough matter to equal the critical density to account for a flat universe would have provided that. However, for many years, it has been evident that there is less than half of the amount of matter in the universe to account for a flat universe. A cosmological constant would provide an energy density to make up for the missing matter density, but would require an extreme amount of fine tuning. The supernovae studies demonstrated that there was an energy density to the universe (but did not define the size of this energy density), and the recent Boomerang study demonstrated that this energy density is exactly what one would expect to get a flat universe. How finely tuned must this energy density be to get a flat universe? One part in 10120,5 which is:

1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000


Atheists see a conflict because this level of design is something that one would not expect by chance from a universe that began through a purely naturalistic mechanism. "Common wisdom" is common only to those who must exclude a supernatural explanation for the creation of the universe. In fact, a purely naturalistic cause for the universe is extremely unlikely and, therefore, illogical. The Bible says that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,6 and that He created the universe.7 When a model doesn't work, scientists must be willing to give up their model for a model that fits the facts better. In this case, the supernatural design model fits the data much better than naturalistic random chance model.

All observations of physical phenomena in the universe, such as throwing a ball up in the air, are described by a few simple, elegant mathematical equations.
2. The fine-tuning of physical constants and rations between constants in order to provide a life-permitting universe

Life has certain minimal requirements; long-term stable source of energy, a large number of different chemical elements, an element that can serve as a hub for joining together other elements into compounds, etc.
In order to meet these minimal requirements, the physical constants, (such as the gravitational constant), and the ratios between physical constants, need to be withing a narrow range of values in order to support the minimal requirements for life of any kind.
Slight changes to any of the physical constants, or to the rations between the constants, will result in a universe inhospitable to life.
The range of possible ranges over 70 orders of magnitude.
Although each individual selection of constants and ratios is as unlikely as any other selection, the vast majority of these possibilities do not support the minimal requirements of life of any kind. (In the same way as any hand of 5 cards that is dealt is as likely as any other, but you are overwhelmingly likely NOT to get a royal flush. In our case, a royal flush is a life-permitting universe).
Examples of finely-tuned constants and ratios: (there are more examples in the lecture)

a) The strong force: (the force that binds nucleons (= protons and neutrons) together in nucleus, by means of meson exchange)

if the strong force constant were 2% stronger, there would be no stable hydrogen, no long-lived stars, no hydrogen containing compounds. This is because the single proton in hydrogen would want to stick to something else so badly that there would be no hydrogen left!
if the strong force constant were 5% weaker, there would be no stable stars, few (if any) elements besides hydrogen. This is because you would be able to build up the nuclei of the heavier elements, which contain more than 1 proton.
So, whether you adjust the strong force up or down, you lose stars than can serve as long-term sources of stable energy, or you lose chemical diversity, which is necessary to make beings that can perform the minimal requirements of living beings. (see below)
b) The conversion of beryllium to carbon, and carbon to oxygen

Life requires carbon in order to serve as the hub for complex molecules, but it also requires oxygen in order to create water.
Carbon is like the hub wheel in a tinker toy set: you can bind other elements together to more complicated molecules (e.g. – “carbon-based life), but the bonds are not so tight that they can’t be broken down again later to make something else.
The carbon resonance level is determined by two constants: the strong force and electromagnetic force.
If you mess with these forces even slightly, you either lose the carbon or the oxygen.

3. Fine-tuning to allow a habitable planet

A number of factors must be fine-tuned in order to have a planet that supports life
Initial estimates predicted abundant life in the universe, but revised estimates now predict that life is almost certainly unique in the galaxy, and probably unique in the universe.
Even though there are lots of stars in the universe, the odds are against any of them supporting complex life.
Here are just a few of the minimal requirements for habitability: must be a single star solar system, in order to support stable planetary orbits, the planet must be the right distance from the sun in order to have liquid water at the surface, the planet must sufficient mass in order to retain an atmosphere, etc.
Evidence #2: The origin of the universe

1. The progress of science has shown that the entire physical universe came into being out of nothing (= “the big bang”). It also shows that the cause of this creation event is non-physical and non-temporal. The cause is supernatural.

Atheism prefers an eternal universe, to get around the problem of a Creator having to create the universe.
Discovery #1: Observations of galaxies moving away from one another confirms that the universe expanded from a single point.
Discovery #2: Measurements of the cosmic background radiation confirms that the universe exploding into being.
Discovery #3: Predictions of elemental abundances prove that the universe is not eternal.
Discovery #4:The atheism-friendly steady-state model and oscillating model were both falsified by the evidence.
And there were other discoveries as well, mentioned in the lecture.
Evidence #3: The origin of life

1. The progress of science has shown that the simplest living organism contains huge amounts of biological information, similar to the Java code I write all day at work. This is a problem for atheists, because the sequence of instructions in a living system has to come together all at once, it cannot have evolved by mutation and selection – because there was no replication in place prior to the formation of that first living system!

Living systems must support certain minimum life functions: processing energy, storing information, and replicating.
There needs to be a certain amount of complexity in the living system that can perform these minimum functions.
But on atheism, the living system needs to be simple enough to form by accident in a pre-biotic soup, and in a reasonable amount of time.
The minimal functionality in a living system is a achieved by DNA, RNA and enzymes. DNA and RNA are composed of sequences of proteins, which are in turn composed of sequences of amino acids.
Consider the problems of building a chain of 100 amino acids

The amino acids must be left-handed only, but left and right kinds are equally abundant in nature. How do you sort out the right-handed ones?
The amino acids must be bound together using peptide bonds. How do you prevent other types of bonds?
Each link of the amino acid chain needs to be carefully chosen such that the completed chain with fold up into a protein. How do you choose the correct amino acid for each link from the pool of 20 different kinds found in living systems?
In every case, a human or other intelligence could solve these problems by doing what intelligent agents do best: making choices.
But who is there to make the choices on atheism?
The best current atheistic theory is that unobservable aliens seeded the earth with life.

The problem of the origin of life is not a problem of chemistry, it is a problem of engineering. Every part of car functionality can be understood and described using the laws of physics and chemistry. But an intelligence is still needed in order to assemble the components into a system that has the minimal requirements for a functioning vehicle.

Conclusion

In all three areas, scientists expected that the data would be consistent with atheism. First, scientists expected that life could exist even if the physical constants and ratios were altered. The progress of science said NO. Second, scientists expected that the universe would be eternal. The progress of science said NO. Third, scientists expected that the origin of life would be simple. The progress of science said NO.

Cosmic fine-tuning: the "anthropic coincidences"

http://www.unm.edu/~hdelaney/finetuning.html

Second BIG challenge to naturalism - vanishingly low probability that so many fundamental properties of the universe could be precisely as required for life to exist.

There is now broad agreement among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in several respects ‘fine-tuned' for life.
P. Davies Int. J. of Astrobiology 2(2): 115, (2003).

1) Explosive power of the creation event precisely matched to power of gravity; density precisely matched with critical density, cosmological constant



If the force of explosion was only slightly higher, the universe would only consist of gas without stars, galaxies, or planets. Without stars, galaxies and planets, life could not exist. The matching had to be to the remarkable precision of one part in 1055. ... Some physicists believe that one explanation can be found in a model of an inflationary epoch at about 10-35 of the first second where a short period of accelerated expansion caused the perfect balance between gravity and the rate of expansion and density and critical density. This could explain the very flat characteristics of the universe given by these precise matchings, but the inflation required in this model would itself require an extraordinary fine tuning to yield the precisely balanced result. If the inflationary model is true, the inflationary epoch would contain enormous fine tuning and the precision of values issue is only removed one step.

answer of infidels to this book :

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/graham_oppy/overman.html


In any case, there is one constant whose value does seem remarkably well adjusted in our favor. It is the energy density of empty space, also known at the cosmological constant."
S. Weinberg, Skeptical Inquirer, Sept./Oct. 2001, pg 67.

At the Nature of Nature conference at Baylor Unviersity, April 2000, Weinberg stated that the cosmological constant appears to be fine-tuned to 1 part in 10120.


In response to a question as to whether inflation eliminates the need for fine-tuning, Alan Guth commented:


"As far as finely tuning things, there are still two important fine tuning problem that are not solved. One is the problem that's called the cosmological constant problem. It's basically the problem of why the energy density of the vacuum is either zero or very close to being zero. Current models of physics require fine tuning in order to make the energy of the vacuum turn out to be either zero or very, very small."

Alan Guth, quoted by F. Heeren in "Show Me God", pg 387.


A straightforward estimation suggests that empty space should weigh several orders of magnitude of orders of magnitude (no misprint here!) more than it does. It "should" be much denser than a neutron star, for example. ... To me, the discrepancy concerning the density of empty space is the most mysterious fact of all of physical science, the fact with the greatest potential to rock the foundations. We're obviously missing some major insight here.

Frank Wilczek, Physics Today, Oct. 2003 pg 10-11.


At present it is clearly too early to choose one cosmological model over the other. It is getting increasingly difficult to find accord with a flat universe without a cosmolgocial constant. The question then becomes: Which fundamental fine-tuning problem is one more willing to worry about, the flatness problem or the cosmological constant problem? The latter involves a fine-tuning of over 120 orders of magnitude, if the cosmological constant is nonzero and comparable to the density of clustered matter today, while the former involves a fine-tuning of perhaps only 60 orders of magnitude, if one arbitrarily fixes the energy density of the universe at the Planck time to be slightly less than the closure density.

L. M. Krauss, The Astrophysical Journal, 1998, 501: p 465.



Although Einstein dismissed the cosmological constant as a personal blunder, quantum mechanics makes it obligatory. Unfortunately, even the best quantum "mechanics" have failed to produce a sensible prediction for L. The sum of zero-point energies diverges due to short-wavelength modes. Truncating at an energy scale beyond which we can appeal to physics ignorance illustrates the enormity of the problem: for a 100-GeV cutoff, WL - 1055. This disparity is the greatest embarrassment in all of theoretical physics.

Michael S. Turner, Physics Today, April, 2003.


"This is an incredibly highly ordered event, extremely highly ordered, its just the opposite of a chaotic event."

Eric Carlson, Senior astronomer at the Adler Planetarium, in an interview with Fred Hereen shown in the video "Scientific Evidence For God"



2) ripples in the cosmic microwave background


The pattern demonstrates that the event was not a haphazard event. The fluctuations had to be just as they were for galaxies to form and life to be possible.



"If your religious, it's like looking at God"

George Smoot, quoted by Milton Rothman in Free Inquiry, vol 13, no 1, 1992.1993 pg 12.


"The big bang, the most cataclysmic event we can imagine, on closer inspection appears finely orchestrated"

G. Smoot and Davidson, "Wrinkles in Time", 1993, 135.


"the most important discovery of the century, if not of all time"

S. Hawking quoted by G. Smoot and Davidson, "Wrinkles in Time" 1993, pg 283.


"The first loose end has to do with the presence of galaxies and large-scale structure. ... these huge structures could not exist today unless the seeds for their formation had been present in the early universe. However, the standard Big Bang theory says nothing at all about how such seeds might have come to exist. The only explanation the theory allows is that they were "already there" at the instant of creation and were not destroyed by the subsequent heat. ...
Finally, our first loose end, concerning the origin of the seeds around which galaxies and larger structures grew, is tied up quite easily. ... Thus inflation says that the seeds for galaxies arose naturally from the amplification of tiny quantum ripples.

J. Bennett, On the Cosmic Horizon, pg 124, 130.



Inflation is a wonderfully attractive, logically compelling idea, but very basic challenges remain. Can we be specific about the cause of inflation, and ground it in explicit, well-founded physics? To be concrete, can we calculate the correct amplitude of fluctuations convincingly? Existing implementations actually have a problem on that score; getting the amplitude sufficiently small takes some nice adjustment.

Frank Wilczek, Physics Today, Oct. 2003 pg 10.


Davies, Ellis, and others argue that such inflation would itself have needed very accurate tuning to occur at all and to leave roughness of just the right amount to lead to galaxies. Two components of an inflation-driving "cosmological constant" might have had to balance each other with an accuracy of better than one part in 1050.

John Leslie, "The Anthropic Principle today", in Modern Cosmology & Philosphy, pg 291.





In response to a question as to whether inflation eliminates the need for fine-tuning, Alan Guth commented:
"As far as finely tuning things, there are still two important fine tuning problems that are not solved. ... The second problem is more directly related to inflation. The cosmic background radiation is uniform in temperature to about one part in a hundred thousand. In order to get these nonuniformities to be as small as what we observe, we have to arrange that certain numbers that describe the underlying particle physics be very, very small, for reasons which we do not, at the present time, understand."

Alan Guth, quoted by F. Hereen in "Show Me God", pg 387.




3). the existence of elements necessary for life



"How is it that common elements such as carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen happened to have just the right kind of atomic structure that they needed to combine to make the molecules upon which life depends? It is almost as though the universe had been consciously designed."

Richard Morris, The Fate of the Universe, 1982, 155.


"A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question."

Fred Hoyle, "The Universe: Past and Present Reflections", Annual Reviews of Astonomy and Astrophysics, 20 (1982), 16.


"Without such accidents water could not exist as a liquid, chains of carbon atoms could not form complex organic molecules, and hydrogen atoms could not form breakable bridges between molecules"

Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe,1979, 393.




4). ratio of mass of proton to mass of electron (1,836)

If this ratio were slightly different there would be no chemistry, and no life. S. Hawking cites this example as one of the many fundamental numbers in nature, and he says
"The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life".

S. Hawking, A Brief History of Time,1988, pg 125.



5). the magnitude of each of the four fundamental forces


"The bulk of the carbon in our universe is produced in the triple-alpha process in helium-burning red giant stars. We calculated the change of the triple-alpha reaction rate in a microscopic12-nucleon model of the 12C nucleus and looked for the effects of minimal variations of the strengths of the underlying interactions. ... We conclude that a change of more than 0.5% in the strength of the strong interaction or more than 4% change in the strength of the Coulomb force would destroy either nearly all C or all O in every star.

H. Oberhummer, A. Csoto, H. Schlattl, SCIENCE 289, July 7, 2000, pg 88.

"Every one of these forces must have just the right strength if there is to be any possibility of life. For example, if electrical forces were stronger than they are, then no element heavier than hydrogen could form. ... But electrical repulsion cannot be too weak. If it were, protons would combine too easily, and the sun. ... (assuming that it had somehow managed to exist up until now) would explode like a thermonuclear bomb."

Richard Morris, The Fate of the Universe, 1982, pg 153.


"If the strong nuclear force were even 0.3 % stronger or 2% weaker the universe would never be able to support life."

Barrow and Tipler, Anthropic Cosmological Principle, 318-327, 354-359.

http://www.physics.sfsu.edu/~lwilliam/sota/anth/anthropic_principle_index.html

http://digg.com/space/The_Biocentric_Universe_Theory

The Anthropic Principle was proposed in Poland in 1973, during a special two-week series of synopsia commemorating Copernicus’s 500th birthday. It was proposed by Brandon Carter, who, on Copernicus’s birthday, had the audacity to proclaim that humanity did indeed hold a special place in the Universe, an assertion that is the exact opposite of Copernicus’s now universally accepted theory.
Carter was not, however, claiming that the Universe was our own personal playground, made specifically with humanity in mind. The version of the Anthropic Principle that he proposed that day, which is now referred to as the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP) stated only that by our very existence as carbon-based intelligent creatures, we impose a sort of selection effect on the Universe. For example, in a Universe where just one of the fundamental constants that govern nature was changed - say, the strength of gravity - we wouldn’t be here to wonder why gravity is the strength it is. The following is the official definition of the WAP:

“Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): the observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on the values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.” (The Anthropic Cosmological Principle by John Barrow and Frank Tipler, p. 16)
Later, Carter also proposed the Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP), which states that the Universe had to bring humanity into being. This version is much more teleological, if not theological, and is of a highly speculative nature. Nonetheless, Carter had scientific reasons to propose it. The definition of the SAP) is as follows:

“Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP): the Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in it’s history.” (The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, p. 21)
In addition to the WAP and SAP, there are the Participatory and Final Anthropic Principles. The Participatory Anthropic Principle states not only that the Universe had to develop humanity (or some other intelligent, information-gathering life form) but that we are necessary to it’s existence, as it takes an intelligent observer to collapse the Universe’s waves and probabilities from superposition into relatively concrete reality. The Final Anthropic Principle states that once the Universe has brought intelligence into being, it will never die out. These two are also very speculative.

Stephen Hawking on the Anthropic Principle

http://www.emmanueldowntown.org/steven-hawking-on-the-anthropic-principle.html

the anthropic principle refers to a collection of scientific insights indicating that the possibility of the evolution of carbon-based life is dependent upon a very delicate balance among the basic forces of nature and also on very specific initial circumstances for the universe.
An example of one of these scientific insights is set out by Stephen Hawking in the following way: "Why is the universe so close to the dividing line between collapsing again and expanding indefinitely? In order to be as close as we are now, the rate of early expansion had to be chosen fantastically accurately. If the rate of expansion one second after the Big Bang had been less than one part in 10 to the 10th power, the universe would have collapsed after a few million years. If it had been greater by one part in 10 to the 10th power, the universe would have been essentially empty after a few million years. In neither case would it have lasted long enough for life to develop. Thus one either has to appeal to the anthropic principle or find some physical explanation of why the universe is the way it is." Hawking is saying that a difference of one part in ten billion in the rate of cosmic expansion would have been enough to preclude the emergence of life.
This is one of the scientific insights that make up the anthropic principle. There are others. The question remains: What is the best explanation of these anthropic phenomena?

Earth's particular location gives humans a special window to the solar system, the Milky Way galaxy, and the universe itself. In virtually any other galaxy or at any other location in Earth's galaxy and at every other time in cosmic history, the view to the surrounding area would be so unstable and/or so occluded that the form, structure, size, and other characteristics of the galaxy and universe would remain obscure to any sentient observers.10 Earth's creatures enjoy a special view to the splendors of the cosmos. Nowhere else and at no other time in the universe would such glory be visible.11

The importance of the anthropic principle can hardly be overstated. It returns legitimacy and respectability to the human species as a worthy, even primary, subject of scientific research. Further, the anthropic principle has the potential to bring about a paradigm shift arguably as profound as any shift in human remembrance.

COSMIC ANTICIPATION
As early as the 1980s, physicist Paul Davies concluded that the physical evidence for design of the universe and of Earth for human life could rightly be described as overwhelming.12 Today, no physicist or astronomer who has researched the question denies that the universe, the Milky Way galaxy, and the solar system possess compelling hallmarks of intentional design for human life. Many researchers have commented over the past twenty years that it seems the universe "knew" humans were coming.

Brandon Carter, the British mathematician who coined the term "anthropic principle" (1974),13 noted the strange inequity of a universe that spends about 15 billion years "preparing" for the existence of a creature that has the potential to survive no more than 10 million years (optimistically).14 Carter formalized this enormous imbalance between the time required to produce the possibility for human life and the brevity of the species' (potential) survival as the "anthropic principle inequality."15

In response, some researchers speculated that the human species might represent an anomaly, an exception to the rule (e.g., a late bloomer or a more fragile species) among many possible intelligent life forms elsewhere in the cosmos. However, Carter and (later) astrophysicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler demonstrated that the inequality exists for virtually any conceivable intelligent species under any conceivable life-support conditions.16 Roughly 15 billion years represents a minimum preparation time for advanced life: 11 billion toward formation of a stable planetary system, one with the right chemical and physical conditions for primitive life, and four billion more years toward preparation of a planet within that system, one richly layered with the biodeposits necessary for civilized intelligent life. Even this long time and convergence of "just right" conditions reflect miraculous efficiency.

Moreover the physical and biological conditions necessary to support an intelligent civilized species do not last indefinitely. They are subject to continuous change: the Sun continues to brighten, Earth's rotation period lengthens, Earth's plate tectonic activity declines, and Earth's atmospheric composition varies. In just 10 million years or less, Earth will lose its ability to sustain human life. In fact, this estimate of the human habitability time window may be grossly optimistic. In all likelihood, a nearby supernova eruption, a climatic perturbation, a social or environmental upheaval, or the genetic accumulation of negative mutations will doom the species to extinction sometime sooner than twenty thousand years from now.17

These figures demonstrate that the inequality is extreme. The survival time for advanced intelligent physical life is only a millionth as long as the time required to produce the conditions necessary for its survival.

Another British mathematical physicist, Roger Penrose, was among the first to give voice to a philosophical conclusion: the extremely high level of fine-tuning astronomers and physicists discern powerfully suggests a purpose behind the universe.18 That the design is so focused on providing a home for humanity implies that a significant, even central, part of the purpose for the universe is anthropic. Specifically, the universe was created for the express benefit of humanity.

Given the awesome capacities necessary to create and design the universe, the purpose for humanity must be significant indeed. Further, given that human survivability is cosmically brief means that humanity's purpose can and must be fulfilled quickly. The rapid fulfillment of a profoundly significant purpose for humanity—that's the message of the Bible. No other "revelation" makes such perfect sense of everything humanity observes and experiences.

PURPOSE, DESTINY, AND HOPE
Distinguished astrophysicists Lawrence Krauss and Glenn Starkman recently analyzed the ultimate consequences of the measured self-stretching property of the universe.19 They deduced that the universe from now on will expand at a faster and faster rate. This exponentially increasing cosmic expansion means that astronomers will see less and less of the universe as time goes on. Thus, knowledge of the universe will decrease with time. Eventually, the cosmic expansion will be so rapid that intelligent beings will lose the capacity to draw adequate energy for work from the heat flow of the universe. All forms of knowledge, then, will necessarily decrease. Inevitably, heat flow will be so tiny that all metabolic reactions will cease, and with their ceasing, all possibility for physical life will end. "Consciousness is eventually lost."20

Krauss and Starkman's response—an expression of despair—betrays their presumption that humanity's destiny must lie within this universe. An important aspect of the biblical message is that God has an existence and a plan for humanity beyond the confines of the cosmos. His plan involves the cosmos but does not end there. Throughout the Old and New Testaments, God reveals His plan to prepare those humans for a paradise vastly superior to anything Earth can offer, a new creation completely beyond the physics and dimensions of the universe.

Therefore, the biblical basis for purpose, destiny, and hope supersedes the limitations, even predicts the limitations and cessation, of the universe. The anthropic principle becomes personal, however, with the commonsense observation that human beings universally and uniquely yearn for a sense of destiny and purpose. Human beings stay alive not just by the powerful instinct to survive possessed by all living creatures, but by a unique and universal awareness that they exist for a reason beyond mere physical survival.

THE CHRIST CONNECTION
Those people who need hard data to affirm their sense of destiny can find it. The space-time theorems of general relativity prove that an Entity transcending matter, energy, space, and time is the cause of the universe in which humanity lives.21 Of all the gods, forces, or principles that people have proposed throughout human history to explain the existence and operation of the universe, only the God of the Bible is consistent with the characteristics of the cause established in these space-time theorems.22 Only the Bible predicts and explains the anthropic principle.

True to their inquisitive and skeptical nature, some scientists and philosophers have challenged the validity of the anthropic principle and certainly of its implications for the Christian worldview and faith. Stephen Hawking and Carl Sagan argued that the design of such a vast cosmos for such an infinitesimal creature seems wasteful, thus inconsistent with the character of the Christian's all-wise, all-powerful God.23 Such a God, they imply, would have fulfilled His purpose of providing humanity a home by creating just one planet in one planetary system in a relatively tiny and short-lived cosmos.

This argument fails to consider, however, that purpose governs what a person (or God) does as opposed to what he can do. Given the physics of the universe, the laws and properties for which the Bible reveals a specific divine purpose (see "The Physics of Sin," page 00), the universe is the necessary size and age. A universe either slightly less massive or more massive than what researchers observe would be unsuitable for human life.24 In a human frame of reference, God's provision of such an enormous universe so carefully "machined" for billions of years for human benefit makes a compelling statement about His care for humanity—and His purposefulness.

Some skeptics have attempted to trivialize the anthropic principle with the assertion that humans simply would not be here to observe the universe unless the extremely unlikely did somehow happen to take place. British philosopher Richard Swinburne responded to this notion with a simple illustration.25 He points out that the survivor of a firing squad execution would not attribute his or her survival to a lucky accident. Rather, the survivor would conclude that either the rifles were loaded with blanks or that each of the executioners missed on purpose. The measured fine-tuning of the universe tells us that Someone purposed for humans to exist for a certain period of time.

Another argument claims that there is nothing remarkable about the fine-tuning of the universe if an infinitude of universes exist, each with a different set of characteristics. In this case, chance could dictate that at least one would manifest the characteristics necessary for human life.

The fallacy in this appeal represents a form of the gambler's fallacy. A gambler might conclude that an ordinary coin could land on heads a hundred thousand consecutive times if he rationalizes that 2100,000 coins exist (though he cannot see them), each being flipped 100,000 times by 2100,000 coin flippers. Statistically, one of these coins could come up heads 100,000 times. Such thinking is considered fallacious, however, because the gambler has no evidence for the existence of the other coins, coin flippers, or distinct results. With a sample size of one, the only rational conclusion to draw is that someone "fixed" the coin to land on heads. In the case of the universe, no evidence can be found for the existence of other universes. In fact, the principles of relativity dictate that the space-time envelope of a universe that contains observers can never overlap that of any other universe(s). Thus, the sample size for human observers is one and always will be one, and the conclusion that Someone purposed, or fixed, the universe for human existence remains compelling.

TESTING THE CONCLUSION
The anthropic principle invites testing. A skeptic not yet persuaded that the fine-tuning of the universe reflects more than a lucky coin toss can choose to examine the universe, the "coin," more closely. If the anthropic principle and its implications for transcendent design are false, research will discover declining evidence for fine-tuning and existing evidence will be erased by new data. If, on the other hand, the anthropic principle and its implications are true, research will yield an increase in both the number of fine-tuned characteristics and the degree of fine-tuning. Based on the accumulating evidence, to bet on the anthropic principle seems safer than taking another breath. The anthropic principle energizes humanity's climb on the pinnacles of Truth.

Getting the Right Electrons:

The Universe must be fine tuned enough so that the precise number of electrons must exist. The number of electrons needs to be equalvalent to the number of protons to an acuracy of 1 part in 10^37. This balance is needed so that the electromagnetic force does not overpower the gravitational force when the universe was formed. Had the number of protons and electrons not been "perfectly" balanced, gravity would not have been the dominate force to cause the proper formation of the planets, stars, and galaxies .
10^37 is such a great number; the following analogy is helpful in understanding this number:

Cover the entire North American continent in dimes all the way up to the moon (a height of 239,000 miles). Next, pile dimes on a billion other continents the same size as North America up to the moon. Paint one dime red and mix that one into the rest of the dimes on the billions of continents. Blindfold a friend and ask them to pick out the red dime. The chances that they will pick out the red dime are 1 in 10^37. And this is only one of the parameters that must be balanced within 1 part in 10^37 to allow any kind of life to form.

Objection 1: Problem of Old Evidence
Objection 2:Laws of Nature Don't need to be Explained

Objection 3: Something Had to Happen -- The Problem of Specification

Objection 4: The Possibility of Exotic Life

Objection 5: The Principle of Mediocrity & Rejection of Anthropocentricity

Objection 6: Too Small a Sample (One Observed Universe)


What are the Coincidences?

The existence of "anthropic coincidences" was first discovered in the early 1970's by cosmologist Branden Carter. Since that time, the list of coincidences has grown dramatically. An anthropic coincidence consists of some feature of the laws of nature, the fundamental constituents of matter, or the initial condition of the universe that had to take a value within some interval in order for life (and hence, for human observers) to exist at all. These coincidences can be grouped into several categories: (i) features of the fundamental laws of nature, including the relative strengths of fundamental forces and other physical constants, (ii) characteristics of the fundamental particles of matter, (iii) the size, degree of flatness and smoothness, and rate of expansion of matter emerging from the big bang. and (iv) features of the solar system and of the earth. (The fourth category could be considered a separate sort of coincidence, since it refers to unlikelihood of even one planet as suited for life as is the earth to come into being. Unlike the other coincidences, it does not refer to universal features of the cosmos.)

If any of these features of the universe had lied outside a narrow interval of values, then the existence of any sort of complex chemistry would have been impossible. Complex, self-replicating life seems to depend on the co-existence of a combination of lighter and heavier elements, including such elements as hydrogen, oxygen and carbon. Furthermore, life seems to depend on the formation of stars and planetary systems, since no life could exist in the frigidity of starless deep space or within the superheated interiors of stars. These conditions are interconnected, since only if stars can form and later become supernovas can any of the heavier elements be formed..These processes of star formation and destruction turn out to be very sensitive to the slightest variations in the fundamental constants of the universe. Consequently, the universe is in some sense "fine-tuned" for the possibility of complex chemistry and thus of life.

In most cases, the degree of sensitivity can be quantified precisely. This quantifiable degree of fine-tuning is an absolute, measure-independent quantity. In some cases, the degree of sensitivity is almost unimaginably high. For instance, if the ratio of the electromagnetic force to the gravitational force were changed by one part in 10 to the 40th power, star formation would have been impossible. Similarly, the ratio of the total number of electrons to the total number of protons could not vary by more than one in 10 to the 37th power, without disastrous implications for galaxy and star formation.

How surprising are these coincidences? This depends on what philosophers call your prior probabilities. If I knew nothing about the the ratio of electromagnetic force to gravitational force, and if I knew nothing about the importance of this ratio to life, I would certainly assign a very low prior probability to that ratio's lying within an interval that is no wider than one part in 10 to the 40th power. Thus, discovering both that there is such an interval defining the conditions of life, and that the actual value does lie within that interval, is to discover something that would be very surprising to any reasonable investigator. These surprising discovery seems to call for some explanation.

We will consider two possible explanations of the coincidences: theism, and the ensemble of universes/observer selection hypothesis. According to theism, the cause of the universe is an intelligent and purposeful agent who had the eventual existence of life as a purpose and end, and who intentionally set the values of the fundamental constants so as to realize that purpose. According to the ensemble-of-universes hypothesis, there are an astronomically large number of universes, each on the scale of the observable universe. In each of these universes, the fundamental constants take values at random. Since there are so many of them, chance alone is able to ensure that (with a high degree of probability) at least one of them will be life-permitting. It is not surprising that we find ourselves in one of these universes, since observers like us could not exist in any other kind.

In two weeks, we will consider the question of which of these two hypotheses provides the best explanation for the anthropic coincidences. For now, I would like to turn to six objections that have been made to the claim that it is desirable, or even possible, to explain the anthropic coincidences.

Objection #1: The Problem of Old Evidence

We already know that life exists, and, consequently, we know that whatever is physically required for life to exist must be actual. Any hypothesis that purports to "explain" the coincidences is explaining something we already know to be true. It is not thereby making a risky prediction that may or may not be borne out by subsequent observation. Hypotheses can be confirmed or made more probable only when they make such risky predictions, as when Halley predicted the return of Halley's comet, or Einstein predicted the bending of light by the sun's gravity.

This objection can be illustrated by using Bayes's theorem, a basic theorem of probability theory. Bayesians stipulate that the posterior probability of a hypothesis, after observing result E, is equal to P(H/E). According to Bayes's theorem, P(H/E) is equal to the product of P(H), the prior probability of H, and P(E/H), the degree to which H made E probable, divided by P(E), the prior probability of E. The probability of H is increased if two conditions are met: (i) P(H) is not zero, (ii) P(E/H) is greater than P(E). If E is not a prediction, then we already know E to be true. In this case, P(E) is 1, and P(E/H) cannot be greater than P(E). This means that no hypothesis can be confirmed by E. This implication of Bayes's theorem is called "the problem of old evidence".

Most philosophers of science believe that this apparent implication of Bayesian theory should not be accepted. There are many cases in the history of science in which a theory was accepted on the basis of its ability to explain, in a very simple way, a wide range of previously-known data. For instance, Copernicus's theory was accepted entirely on the basis of its providing a simpler, more economical explanation of astronomical data that had been known for hundreds, or even thousands of years. According to the strict Bayesian account, this data should have provided no support whatsoever to Copernicus's theory -- an incredible result.

The standard solution to the problem goes something like this. Instead of using the actual probability of the data, E, in using Bayes's theorem, we instead use a hypothetical probability value, one representing how likely we would have found E to be, had we never actually observed it. Thus, the astronomical data we have observed for many thousands of years could receive a very low hypothetical probability, representing how unlikely these observations would have been to one unfamiliar with them.

Applying this solution to the case of the anthropic coincidences, we would have to assign some hypothetical probability to the anthropic coincidences. Given the narrowness of the required intervals, how surprising is it that life actually came into being? The answer would seem to be, very unlikely (unless there are a large number of actual universes within which life could arise by chance).

John Leslie illustrates this point by means of the Firing Squad analogy on pages 13 and 14. Imagine that you are facing a firing squad of sharpshooters, firing at close range. Somehow, you survive the volley. Is the volley something that requires an explanation? It is old evidence -- you already know with probability 1 that you are still alive. Nonetheless, it is, from a suitably impersonal perspective, a very surprising thing that you did survive, under the circumstances. Similarly, we already know, with probability 1, that life exists, but this is a very surprising fact, given the anthropic coincidences that were required.

Laws of Nature Cannot Be Explained

Some have objected that the anthropic coincidences cannot be explained, since they involve the fundamental laws of nature. The laws of nature are used in explaining other things -- they themselves cannot be explained. They are rock-bottom, matters of physical necessity, immutable and uncaused. This objection is sometimes based on actual scientific practice -- scientists seek to discover the laws of nature and to use these laws in constructing explanations of phenomena. They do not try to explain the laws of nature themselves.

There are several points to make in response to this. First, it is no longer true that scientists never seek to explain the laws of nature. Much of recent cosmology and unified force theory has attempted to do that. Second, even if scientists never did attempt to explain the fundamental laws, it would still be an open question whether they should do so. Finally, whether something can or should be explained is itself an empirical matter, to be decided on a case by case basis, and not on the basis of dogmatic, a priori pronouncements. The anthropic coincidences are themselves excellent evidence that the laws of nature can and should be explained. If the laws really were absolute rock bottom, inexplicable brute facts, then we would be faced with a set of inexplicable coincidences. If the only price we have to pay in order to explain these coincidences is to revise our beliefs about the rock-bottom status of physical laws, this is a small price to pay.

There is an episode near the end of Carl Sagan's novel, Contact, that illustrates this point. A mathematician discovers, hidden in the apparently random sequence of numbers in the binary expansion of pi, an encrypted, three-dimensional hologram of the cosmos. The further the binary expansion is carried out, the sharper is the resolution of the hologram. Further, the hologram gives absolutely accurate information about the relative positions of galaxies and galaxy clusters, leading to new discoveries about the cosmos. In light of this discovery, the only possible conclusion to draw is that the number pi is an artefact, created by some unfathomable intellect, who encoded it with this astronomical information. In advance of this remarkable discovery, no one would have thought of the value of pi as something that could be explained in terms of anything else. It seems like a mathematical brute fact, rock bottom if anything is. However, this conviction is subject to change in the light of new information. Similarly, the discovery of the anthropic coincidences should lead us to revise our prior conviction that the fundamental laws and constants of the universe could not be explained.

Something Had to Happen -- The Problem of Specification

Stephen Jay Gould, among others, has offered this objection. It is true that the anthropic settings of the physical constants is antecedently very unlikely. However, whatever value these constants had taken would also have been, from one point of view or another, extremely unlikely. Unlikely things happen all the time. Every time a hand of poker is dealt out, the exact constitution of the hands involved is extremely unlikely. The exact position of the molecules in this room at the present time is an astronomically unlikely arrangement.

This objection raises a fundamental problem of statistical inference: the problem of specification. If every outcome is equally unlikely, how is it that at some times we are able to exclude chance as an explanation, instead preferring the hypothesizing of some causal mechanism?

The general answer to this problem would seem to go something like this. A result is specified when it conforms to a very simple pattern, a pattern that can be specified by a simple rule or algorithm. The simpler the rule or pattern, the greater the degree of specification. When a result is very likely and very specified, no explanation is called for. For instance, if I hope that I will get a red card on the next draw, and I do get one, no special explanation is called for. Even though the result was highly specified, it was also highly likely, since I had a 50/50 chance of drawing a red card. When a result is very unlikely but has a low degree of specification, once again, no explanation is needed. If I draw a 2 of hearts, queen of spades, 5 of diamonds, 10 of clubs and 7 of spades, then this particular hand is very unlikely, but it is also relatively unspecified, since it takes quite a bit of information to spell out this particular result. If I were to spell out in equal detail 7 different hands, each fairly undistinguished, then the event of being dealt these 7 hands, in one particular order, is astronomically unlikely, but also highly unspecified.

In contrast, suppose I am dealt a royal flush (a straight flush, ace high) seven times in a row. This is an astronomically unlikely result, and, in the context of a game of poker, also a highly specified result. It conforms to a very simple pattern: being dealt the very best hand seven times in a row. Such an outcome demands an explanation (some sort of non-random shuffling and dealing).

The anthropic coincidences are extremely unlikely. Are they also highly specified? It would seem that they are. They all fall into one simple pattern: conditions necessary for the existence of complex, molecular chemistry. If the realization of this pattern can be explained, it should be.

One might object that the pattern is in fact a very complex one, since life and organic chemistry are themselves very complex. This objection would be based on a confusion. Life is very simple in its specification (something like "self-replication carbon-based chemical systems"), but it is always very complex in its realization. The simplest forms of life that we know about have hundreds of thousands of interdependent parts, each consisting of long chains of amino or nucleic acids. It is this complexity of realization that makes life such an unlikely state for matter to be in. But the complexity of realization does not contradict the fact that the specification of life is quite simple. For example, suppose that my four-year-old son sorts 100 pictures into two piles, one a pile of pictures of living things, and the other a pile of pictures of inanimate objects. The living/non-living pattern is extremely simple, so the result is highly specified, even if each individual picture is highly complex.

The Possibility of Exotic Life

Some have objected that the anthropic coincidences involve a simple failure of imagination. We can see that life like ours, based on carbon molecules, in a universe like ours, organized around stars and galaxies, would be impossible if any of the anthropic coincidences had failed to be realized. However, this may simply overlook the possibility of very exotic life, based on radically different kinds of chemistry and physics, in very exotic universes.

First, it is not at all clear that the anthropic coincidences are really vulnerable to this charge. In many cases, it seems clear that, in the absence of the anthropic coincidences, the universe would have been so short-lived, or so lacking in interesting structure or heterogeneity, that nothing approximating the complexities of life could be possible.

In any case, even if the charge were entirely just, there still remains a remarkable coincidence in need of explanation. All we need to do is to complicate the specification of the event to be explained very slightly. What we need to explain is this: the coincidence of factors necessary for the existence of complex, carbon-based molecules. In so doing, we are trying to explain the coincidences needed to make life like ours possible. The possible existence of exotic life is simply irrelevant to this problem. Whether or not such life is possible, we still are faced with a very unlikely and very specified event. The universe appears to be fine-tuned, not just to make life possible, but to make carbon-based life possible.

John Leslie gives another good illustration of this fact, the story of the Fly on the Wall. Suppose we have a long stone wall. In places, the wall is entirely covered by flies. However, there is one long stretch of the wall, several hundred yards long, on which a solitary fly (and nothing else of any interest) is resting. Call this stretch the alpha segment of the wall. Suddenly, a gunshot rings out, and the solitary fly is shot. In this case, we have an event that this very unlikely (the hitting of one particular point on the alpha segment) and very specified (the hitting of a fly-occupied spot). This event calls for some sort of explanation, even though the hitting of a fly somewhere on the wall would not require an explanation, since the event of hitting-a-fly-somewhere-on-the-wall is not at all unlikely, given the presence of fly-infested stretches of the wall.

Similarly, if exotic life is in fact possible, then we do not need an explanation for the existence of life. We do, however, need an explanation of the existence of carbon-based life, since this is both highly unlikely and highly specified.

Principle of Mediocrity & the Rejection of Anthropocentricity

The principle of mediocrity is a rule-of-thumb for the conduct of science. It requires that we assume that we, and our particular location in space and time, are nothing special. We must assume that we can observe in our own immediate neighborhood is typical of what is and what could be universally. Something like the principle of mediocrity is presupposed whenever we indulge in generalization: whenever we infer that a law of nature exists because we do not observe any violations. If we did not assume that our own space-time neighborhood is typical of the entire universe, then any generalization of our observations would be illegitimate.

The principle of mediocrity might be applied to the anthropic coincidences in the following way. We might say that the principle of mediocrity requires us to assume that all possible universes are very much like the actual universe. Since the actual universe is life-permitting, almost all possible universes must be so. But if almost all possible universes are life-permitting, then that is by itself a sufficient explanation of the anthropic coincidences.

There are at least two problems with this argument. First, the narrowness of the intervals involved (as narrow as one part in 10 to the 40th power) make it very unlikely that almost all possible universes have values that lie within the required intervals. The principle of mediocrity is a reasonable thing to presume at the beginning of our investigations, but when we discover overwhelming evidence that our own universe is very special, this evidence should override the apriori rule of thumb. Second, even if it were true that almost all possible universes are life-permitting, this does not rule out the need for an explanation of this fact. In fact, a theistic explanation would preserve the principle of mediocrity, since a theist will hold that typical universes are life-permitting, since in most cases, God would design the universe to be so.

Another closely related principle of scientific inquiry is the rejection of anthropocentricity. This principle has become firmly engrained in scientific practice ever since the heliocentric model replaced the geocentric model. The point of the principle is to guard against a very common human bias -- that of assuming that we are more important than we are. It is natural for us to assume that we are the center around which everything else revolves, and it is essential to the acquisition of objective, scientific knowledge that we fight against this bias. The anthropic coincidences put the existence of human beings into the cosmic driver's seat, in violation of this principle.

Again, there are a couple of things to be said in response. First, the "anthropic" coincidences are not well-named. They should really be called the biotropic or the carbotic principle, since they concern the possibility of the existence of life, or at least, of carbon-based, planetary life. This does not put the species homo sapiens into any special place in the grand scheme of things. It does not necessarily make the planet earth the center of the universe, since there may, for all we know, be many planets equally well-crafted for the existence of life.

Second, even if the anthropic coincidences do lead us to reject, or at least to modify, the principle of non-anthropocentricity, this seems the reasonable thing to do in light of the actual data. Once again, we cannot let apriori legislation determine in advance how we must respond to any possible data. If we find overwhelming evidence that the cosmos has been fashioned for the sake of life on earth, then we should accept this conclusion. At most, the principle of non-anthropocentricity should make us cautious about jumping too soon to such a conclusion.

Too Small a Sample Size -- Only One Universe

This objection is one first pressed by David Hume. Hume argues that we cannot draw any conclusions about the causes of a thing until we have observed many tokens of the same type. I can conclude that this egg was probably laid by a chicken only on the basis of many observations of chickens laying eggs in the past. Since we can observe only one universe, we cannot possibly be in a position to draw any conclusions about what sort of thing may have caused it.

Right away, we should concede that our situation is not an optimal one. If we could somehow observe 30 or 50 universes, each on the scale of our own, each taking very different sets of values for the fundamental constants, and yet each being structured so as to make life possible, then we would be in an optimal position to draw the conclusion that some kind of creator or designer has been at work. The question remains, however, just how far from optimal is our actual situation?

If we had to rely on only one feature of the universe, or on only two or three, we might well be in a position that warranted extreme caution. We might be wrong in our estimations of the degree of sensitivity of life to small changes in one or two parameters. However, when we have twenty-five or more features of the universe, each of which appears to be highly constrained, the basis for an inference to an appropriate explanation is much stronger.

I cannot see any basis for an absolute prohibition on reasoning from single cases. In science, history and forensics, we do sometimes come up against unique sets of circumstances. We have observed, for example, only two cases of the use of an atomic bomb against a city. Even if the bomb had been used only once, it surely would have been possible for us to attribute the death and destruction to the use of the A-bomb. Everything pointed to the activity of a fireball of intense heat, originating from a single point. Similarly, we see many signs of the activity of some agency capable of fine-tuning the features of the universe for the sake of the existence of life.

Once again, John Leslie offers a parable in support of this response, the case of the Telepathic Painting (page 18). We are to imagine an experiment in which a purported telepath tries to duplicate a painting being produced simultaneously by another person halfway across the world. When the experiment is concluded, the two paintings are compared and found to be identical, stroke-for-stroke. Each painting contains hundreds of details, exactly duplicated in the other. In such a case, we might not accept telepathy as the explanation for the coincidence, but we would surely expect to find some explanation. The fact that we are dealing only with a single case is surely irrelevant. The single case provides by itself enough data to warrant the search for an explanation.

Pick a universe, any universe. How many hypothetical universes would support life?

Possibly only one, say the authors of a new study. Published in the July issue of Science, the report says that if the physical forces within stars were only slightly different, our universe would be almost devoid of carbon and oxygen, and life would not exist.

The findings bring scientists face to face with the question of design. "I am not a religious person, but I could say this universe is designed very well for the existence of life," said Heinz Oberhummer, astrophysicist at the University of Vienna, Austria.

Mr. Oberhummer and his colleagues used computers to simulate the process by which helium burns to produce carbon and oxygen during the red-giant stage of a star's life. They found that even slight changes in either the strong or weak nuclear force would destroy nearly all the carbon or oxygen inside stars-making life impossible.

"The basic forces in the universe are tailor-made for the production of ... carbon-based life," Mr. Oberhummer told Space.com.

It's a new day when scientists who are not "religious persons" are compelled to use the language of design. Mr. Oberhummer's discovery adds to the enormous number of "cosmic coincidences" uncovered by cosmology--intricate balances among the universe's fundamental forces. For example, if the force of gravity were only slightly stronger, all stars would be red dwarfs, too cold to support life. If it were slightly weaker, all stars would be blue giants, burning too briefly for life to develop.

In the atom, the mass of the neutron is delicately balanced with that of the proton; otherwise, protons would decay into neutrons, making life impossible.

"Imagine a universe-creating machine, with thousands of dials representing the gravitational constant, the charge on the electron, the mass of the proton, and so on," said Steve Meyer of Whitworth College. "Each dial has many possible settings, and even the slightest change would make a universe where life was impossible." Yet each dial is set to the exact value needed to sustain life-for no known reason.

As Mr. Oberhummer put it, "we have no idea why the strengths of the forces are fine-tuned" to support life. The reasonable answer seems to be that someone intended it that way.

To avoid that surprising conclusion, cosmologists are scrambling to craft alternative explanations. Some adopt the "many worlds" hypothesis, suggesting that there exist an infinite number of universes. Most would be dark and lifeless, but by sheer probability a few might be suitable for life--and we happen to live in one.

How do scientists account for these zillions of universes? Some say mini-universes crowd together within a larger universe like bubbles in foam. Others propose an oscillating universe--continually expanding, collapsing, then expanding again to form new universes with different physical laws. Strangest by far is physicist Hugh Everett's notion that all possible states of a quantum interaction are actualized, so that slightly different versions of our universe are constantly splitting off--creating a near-infinitude of new universes at every moment.

What's the evidence for these other universes? There is none. By definition, they cannot be observed. Nor has anyone offered a plausible scientific explanation for how they arise. "There is no hint as to what causal mechanism would produce such a splitting," complained philosopher John Earman--which renders it akin to a "miracle."

Moreover, the hypothesis violates the principle of simplicity. As Guillermo Gonzalez of the University of Washington told World, "Invoking an infinitude of unobservable universes to explain the one observable universe is a grotesque violation of Occam's razor," the principle that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.

Other cosmologists try to explain design by a quasi-pantheistic philosophy that attributes intelligence and foresight to the universe itself. In The Fifth Miracle, Paul Davies says, "the laws of the universe are cunningly contrived to coax life into being"; they "somehow know in advance about life and its vast complexity." This year's Templeton prize-winner, Freeman Dyson, muses that "the universe in some sense must have known we were coming."

Of course, the idea of a conscious universe, or of unknowable universes sprouting like mushrooms, goes beyond science and into philosophy. This opens a new opportunity for Christians, says philosopher William Lane Craig. "Cosmology has broken down the boundary between physics and metaphysics," he told World. "And once the door is opened to metaphysics, you can't stop the theist from coming in the door, too."

If the universe appears "tailor-made" for life, perhaps the simplest explanation is that it was tailor-made.

Widely thought to have been demolished by Hume and Darwin, the teleological argument for God's existence has nonetheless continued during this century to find able defenders in F.R. Tennant, Peter Bertocci, and Stuart C. Hackett.

All of these have appealed to what Tennant called "wider teleology," which emphasizes the necessary conditions for the existence and evolution of intelligent life, rather than specific instances of purposive design. Unfortunately, they could speak of this wider teleology for the most part only in generalities, for example, "the fitness of the inorganic to minister to life," but could furnish few specific examples of experimental fact to illustrate this cosmic teleology.

In recent years, however, the scientific community has been stunned by its discovery of how complex and sensitive a nexus of conditions must be given in order for the universe to permit the origin and evolution of intelligent life on Earth. The universe appears, in fact, to have been incredibly fine-tuned from the moment of its inception for the production of intelligent life on Earth at this point in cosmic history. In the various fields of physics and astrophysics, classical cosmology, quantum mechanics, and biochemistry, various discoveries have repeatedly disclosed that the existence of intelligent carbon-based life on Earth at this time depends upon a delicate balance of physical and cosmological quantities, such that were any one of these quantities to be slightly altered, the balance would be destroyed and life would not exist.

Let us briefly review some of the cosmological and physical quantities that have been found to exhibit this delicate balance necessary for the existence of intelligent life on Earth at this epoch in cosmic history.{1}

Examples of Wider Teleology

Physics and Astrophysics

To begin with the most general of conditions, it was shown by G. J. Whitrow in 1955 that intelligent life would be impossible except in a universe of three basic dimensions. When formulated in three dimensions, mathematical physics possesses many unique properties which are necessary prerequisites for the existence of rational information-processing observers like ourselves. Moreover, dimensionality plays a key role in determining the form of the laws of physics and in fashioning the roles played by the constants of nature. For example, it is due to its basic three-dimensionality that the world possesses the chemistry that it does, which furnishes some key conditions necessary for the existence of life. Whitrow could not answer the question why the actual universe happens to possess three dimensions, but noted that if it did not, then we should not be here to ask the question.

More specifically, the values of the various forces of nature appear to be fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life. The world is conditioned principally by the values of the fundamental constants a (the fine structure constant, or electromagnetic interaction), mn/me (proton to electron mass ratio, aG (gravitation), aw (the weak force), and as (the strong force). When one mentally assigns different values to these constants or forces, one discovers that in fact the number of observable universes, that is to say, universes capable of supporting intelligent life, is very small. Just a slight variation in any one of these values would render life impossible.

For example, if as were increased as much as 1%, nuclear resonance levels would be so altered that almost all carbon would be burned into oxygen; an increase of 2% would preclude formation of protons out of quarks, preventing the existence of atoms. Furthermore, weakening as by as much as 5% would unbind deuteron, which is essential to stellar nucleosynthesis, leading to a universe composed only of hydrogen. It has been estimated that as must be within 0.8 and 1.2 its actual strength or all elements of atomic weight greater than four would not have formed. Or again, if aw had been appreciably stronger, then the Big Bang's nuclear burning would have proceeded past helium to iron, making fusion-powered stars impossible. But if it had been much weaker, then we should have had a universe entirely of helium. Or again, if aG had been a little greater, all stars would have been red dwarfs, which are too cold to support life-bearing planets. If it had been a little smaller, the universe would have been composed exclusively of blue giants which burn too briefly for life to develop. According to Davies, changes in either aG or electromagnetism by only one part in 1040 would have spelled disaster for stars like the sun. Moreover, the fact that life can develop on a planet orbiting a star at the right distance depends on the close proximity of the spectral temperature of starlight to the molecular binding energy. Were it greatly to exceed this value, living organisms would be sterilized or destroyed; but were it far below this value, then the photochemical reactions necessary to life would proceed too slowly for life to exist. Or again, atmospheric composition, upon which life depends, is constrained by planetary mass. But planetary mass is the inevitable consequence of electromagnetic and gravitational interactions. And there simply is no physical theory which can explain the numerical values of a and mn/me that determine electromagnetic interaction.

Moreover, life depends upon the operation of certain principles in the quantum realm. For example, the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which states that no more than one particle of a particular kind and spin is permitted in a single quantum state, plays a key role in nature. It guarantees the stability of matter and the size of atomic and molecular structures and creates the shell structure of atomic electrons. In a world not governed by this principle, only compact, superdense bodies could exist, providing little scope for complex structures or living organisms. Or again, quantization is also essential for the existence and stability of atomic systems. In quantum physics, the atom is not conceived on the model of a tiny solar system with each electron in its orbit around the nucleus. Such a model would be unstable because any orbit could be an arbitrary distance from the nucleus. But in quantum physics, there is only one orbital radius available to an electron, so that, for example, all hydrogen atoms are alike. As a consequence, atomic systems and matter are stable and therefore life-permitting.

Classical Cosmology

Several of the constants mentioned in the foregoing section also play a crucial role in determining the temporal phases of the development of the universe and thus control features of the universe essential to life. For example, aG, and mn/me constrain (i) the main sequence stellar lifetime, (ii) the time before which the expansion dynamics of the expanding universe are determined by radiation rather than matter, (iii) the time after which the universe is cool enough for atoms and molecules to form, (iv) the time necessary for protons to decay, and (v) the Planck time.

Furthermore, a fine balance must exist between the gravitational and weak interactions. If the balance were upset in one direction, the universe would have been constituted by 100% helium in its early phase, which would have made it impossible for life to exist now. If the balance were tipped in the other direction, then it would not have been possible for neutrinos to blast the envelopes of supernovae into space and so distribute the heavy elements essential to life.

Furthermore, the difference between the masses of the neutron and the proton is also part of a very delicate coincidence which is crucial to a life-supporting environment. This difference prevents protons from decaying into neutrons, which, if it happened, would make life impossible. This ratio is also balanced with the electron mass, for if the neutron mass failed to exceed the proton mass by a little more than the electron mass, then atoms would simply collapse.

Considerations of classical cosmology allow us to introduce a new parameter, S, the entropy per baryon in the universe, which is about 109. Unless S were < 1011, galaxies would not have been able to form, making planetary life impossible. S is itself a consequence of the baryon asymmetry in the universe, which arises from the inexplicably built-in asymmetry of quarks ever anti-quarks prior to 10-6 seconds after the Big Bang.

In investigating the initial conditions of the Big Bang, one is also confronted with two arbitrary parameters governing the expansion of the universe: Wo, related to the density of the universe, and Ho, related to the speed of the expansion. Observations indicate that at 10-43 seconds after the Big Bang the universe was expanding at a fantastically special rate of speed with a total density close to the critical value on the borderline between recollapse and everlasting expansion. Hawking estimated that even a decrease of one part in a million million when the temperature of the universe was 1010 degrees would have resulted in the universe's recollapse long ago; a similar increase would have precluded the galaxies from condensing out of the expanding matter. At the Planck time, 10-43 seconds after the Big Bang, the density of the universe must have apparently been within about one part in 1060 of the critical density at which space is flat. This results in the so-called "flatness problem": why is the universe expanding at just such a rate that space is Euclidean rather than curved? A second problem that arises is the "homogeneity problem." There is a very narrow range of initial conditions which must obtain if galaxies are to form later. If the initial inhomogeneity ratio were > 10-2, then non-uniformities would condense prematurely into black holes before the stars form. But if the ratio were < 10-5, inhomogeneities would be insufficient to condense into galaxies. Because matter in the universe is clumped into galaxies, which is a necessary condition of life, the initial inhomogeneity ratio appears to be incredibly fine-tuned. Thirdly, there is the "isotropy problem." The temperature of the universe is amazing in its isotropy: it varies by less than one part in a thousand over the whole of the sky. But at very early stages of the universe, the different regions of the universe were causally disjointed, since light beams could not travel fast enough to connect the rapidly receding regions. How then did these unconnected regions all happen to possess the same temperature and radiation density? Penrose has calculated that in the absence of new physical principles to explain this, "the accuracy of the Creator's aim" when he selected this world from the set of physically possible ones would need to have been at least of the order of one part in 1010(123)!

Contemporary cosmologists have found an answer to these three problems--or at least seem certain that they are on its track--in inflationary models of the early universe. According to this adjustment to the standard Big Bang cosmology, between 10 -43 and 10-35 seconds after the Big Bang, the universe underwent an exponentially rapid inflation of space faster than the speed of light. This inflationary epoch resulted in the nearly flat curvature of space, pushed inhomogeneities beyond our horizon, and served to bury us far within a single region of space-time whose parts were causally connected at pre-inflationary times.

Inflationary scenarios have problems of their own --such as getting inflation started, getting it to end without excess turbulence, and having it produce irregularities just right for galaxy formation. Indeed, it is interesting to note that Hawking has recently declared both the so-called "old inflationary model" and the "new inflationary model" to be "now dead as a scientific theory"--though he still holds out hope for Linde's more recent "chaotic inflationary model."{2} Whether this model proves to be any more successful than its predecessors remains yet to be seen; the whole inflationary scenario seems rather ad hoc, and one cannot help but suspect that much of the attraction to such models is due to the desire to escape the sort of inferences as Penrose's conclusion above. More importantly, however, inflationary scenarios seem to require the same sort of fine-tuning which some theorists thought these models had eliminated. For example, in order to proceed appropriately, inflation requires that the two theoretical components of Einstein's cosmological constant, "bare lambda" and "quantum lambda," cancel each other out with an enormously precise though inexplicable accuracy. A change in the strengths of either aG or aw by as little as one part in 10100 would destroy this cancellation on which our lives depend. So although inflationary models may succeed in providing a unifying explanation of some of the forces which play a role in classical cosmology, it does not thereby dispense with the appearance of fine-tuning or teleology.

Biochemistry

Life which is descended from a simpler form of life and which ultimately came into existence spontaneously must be based on water, carbon dioxide, and the basic compounds of the elements C, H, O, and N. Each of these possesses unique properties which, while not sufficient for the existence of life, are necessary conditions of it.

Water, for example, is one of the strangest substances known to science. Its specific heat, surface tension, and most of its other physical properties have anomalous values higher or lower than any other known material. The fact that its solid phase is less dense than its liquid phase, so that ice floats, is virtually a unique property in nature. Its melting point, boiling point, and vaporization point are all anomalously higher than those of other substances. For example, when calculated by atomic weight and number, the boiling point of water would be expected to be -100oC rather than +100oC. The disparity is due to its strong hydrogen bonds, which are difficult to break. Furthermore, because the H-O-H angle in water is so close to the ideal tetrahedral structure, water can form such a structure with very little strain on the bonds. As a result, it tends to polymerize into an open structure, so that ice is less dense than water. This property of water is essential to life, for were ice more dense than water, it would sink to the bottom of bodies of water, where it would remain in the deepest parts until eventually all lakes and oceans would be solidly frozen. Instead, ice forms a protective skin on the surface of reservoirs of water. Water also has a higher specific heat than almost any organic compound. This property allows water to be a store of heat and so stabilize the environment. The thermal conductivity of water is also higher than that of most liquids, which again permits water to act as a temperature stabilizer on the environment. Water has, moreover, a higher heat of vaporization than any known substance. This makes water the best possible coolant by evaporation, and living creatures make extensive use of it in temperature control. Water's high surface tension, exceeded by very few substances, serves to make biochemical reactions more rapid; and the way water bonds shapes organic molecules such as enzymes and nucleic acids into their biologically active forms and permits the formation of cell walls and membranes.

The elements H, O, and C are the most abundant elements in living organisms. They possess many unique properties and are vital to chemical reactions necessary to sustain life. For example, CO2 has the property, unique among gases, of having at ordinary temperatures about the same concentration of molecules per unit volume in water as in air. This enables CO2 to undergo perpetual exchange between living organisms and their environment, so that it is everywhere available for photosynthesis and thereby for molecular synthesis. The element N, on the other hand, is a rare element on Earth, but it does make up 80% of the earth's atmosphere, which is a unique stroke of fortune for Earth's living organisms.

This selective sampling of physical and cosmological quantities which are necessary conditions of the existence of intelligent life on Earth at this point in cosmic history illustrates the sort of wider teleology which Tennant emphasized, but could only dimly envision. The discoveries of contemporary science in this regard are particularly impressive for two reasons: (1) The delicate balance of conditions upon which life depends is characterized by the interweaving of conditions, such that life depends for its existence, not merely upon each individual condition's possessing a value within very narrow limits, but also upon ratios or interactions between values and forces which must likewise lie within narrow parameters. The situation is thus not comparable to a roulette wheel in Monte Carlo's yielding a certain winning number; nor even yet to all the roulette wheels (each representing a physical quantity or constant) in Monte Carlo's turning up simultaneously certain numbers within narrowly circumscribed limits (say, wheel 1 must show 72 or 73 while wheel 2 must show 27-29, etc.); rather it is like all the roulette wheels in Monte Carlo's yielding simultaneously numbers within narrowly prescribed limits and those numbers bearing certain precise relations among themselves (say, the number of wheel 3 must be one-half the square of the number of wheel 17 and twice the number of wheel 6). It seems clear that worlds not permitting intelligent life are vastly more to be expected than life-permitting worlds. (2) The constants and quantities which go to make up this complex nexus of conditions are apparently independent of one another. The development of inflationary models ought to cause us to be cautious in making such a claim; nevertheless, it is the case that there seems to be no nomological necessity requiring the quantities and constants of nature to be related as they are. The value of S, for example, seems to be utterly unrelated to the parameters W, Ho, or inflationary scenarios. But even if it were possible to reduce all the physical and cosmological quantities to a single equation governing the whole of nature, such a complex equation could itself be seen as the supreme instance of teleology and design. Hence, some of those whose hopes seem to lie in the discovery of such an equation are forced to assert that such an equation must be necessarily true; that is to say, there is really only one logically possible set of physical constants and forces. But such a hypothesis seems clearly outlandish. As Nagel observes, none of the statements of natural laws in the various sciences are logically necessary, since their denials are not formally contradictory; moreover, the appropriate procedure in science should then cease to be experimentation, but be deductive proofs in the manner of mathematics.{3} Hence, the notion that the nomological necessity of such an equation should reduce to logical necessity seems obviously false.

The Anthropic Principle

This pattern of discoveries has compelled many scientists to conclude that such a delicate balance cannot be simply dismissed as coincidence, but requires some sort of account. Traditionally, such considerations would have been taken as evidence of divine design--one thinks of Paley's teleological argument in his Natural Theology, for example. Loath to admit the God-hypothesis, however, many scientists are seeking an alternative in the Anthropic Principle, and a tremendous debate involving both scientists and philosophers has broken out concerning this principle, a debate which has spilled over into the popular press and captured the attention of science-minded laymen. The attempt to come to grips with the appearance of cosmic teleology has forced many scientists beyond physics into meta-physics, so that the boundaries between science and philosophy have become ineradicably blurred, well-illustrating George Gale's remark that "we are now entering a phase of scientific activity during which the physicist has out-run his philosophical base-camp, and, finding himself cut off from conceptual supplies, he is ready and waiting for some relief from his philosophical comrades-in-arms."{4} The theistic philosopher can therefore without apology or embarrassment introduce his metaphysical commitment to theism as an at least equally plausible, if not superior, alternative explanation to metaphysical, naturalistic accounts of the complex order of the universe.

Exposition

First proposed by Brandon Carter in 1974,{5} the Anthropic Principle has assumed a number of different forms, generating a great deal of confusion concerning what it is precisely that the principle means to assert. In their recent monumental book, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler state various versions of the principle, the most fundamental being the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP):

WAP: The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable, but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.{6}
Barrow and Tipler regard WAP as "in no way speculative or controversial,"{7} since it is "just a restatement . . . of one of the most important and well-established principles of science: that it is essential to take into account the limitations of one's measuring apparatus when interpreting one's observations."{8} For example, if we were calculating the fraction of galaxies that lie within certain ranges of brightness, our observations would be biased toward the brighter ones, since we cannot see the dim ones so easily. Or again, a ratcatcher may say that all rats are bigger than six inches because that is the size of his traps. Similarly, any observed properties of the universe which may initially appear astonishingly improbable can only be seen in their true perspective after we have accounted for the fact that certain properties could not be observed by us, were they to obtain, because we can only observe those compatible with our own existence. "The basic features of the Universe, including such properties as its shape, size, age, and laws of change must be observed to be of a type that allows the evolution of the observers, for if intelligent life did not evolve in an otherwise possible universe, it is obvious that no one would be asking the reason for the observed shape, size, age, and so forth of the universe."{9} Thus, our own existence acts as a selection effect in assessing the various properties of the universe. For example, a life form which evolved on an earthlike planet "must necessarily see the universe to be at least several billion years old and . . . several billion light years across," for this is the time necessary for the production of the elements essential to life and so forth.{10}

Now, we might ask, why is the "observed" in the quotation in the above paragraph italicized? Why not omit the word altogether? The answer is that the resulting statement

1. The basic features of the universe must be of a type that allows the evolution of observers
is undoubtedly false; for it is not logically or nomologically necessary that the universe embrace intelligent life. Rather what seems to be necessarily true is

2. If the universe is observed by observers which have evolved within it, then its basic features must be of a type that allows the evolution of observers within it.
But (2) seems quite trivial; it does nothing to explain why the universe in fact has the basic features it does.

But Barrow and Tipler contend that while WAP appears to be true, but trivial, it has "far-reaching implications."{11} For the implication of WAP, which they seem to interpret along the lines of (2), is that no explanation of the basic features of the universe need be sought. This contention seems to be intimately connected with what is appropriate to be surprised at. The implication of WAP is that we ought not to be surprised at observing the universe to be as it is, for if it were not as it is, we could not observe it. For example, "No one should be surprised to find the universe to be as large as it is."{12} Or again, ". . . on Anthropic grounds, we should expect to observe a world possessing precisely three spatial dimensions."{13} Or again,

We should emphasize once again that the enormous improbability of the evolution of intelligent life in general and Homo sapiens in particular does not mean we should be amazed we exist at all. This would make as much sense as Elizabeth II being amazed she is Queen of England. Even though the probability of a given Briton being monarch is about 10-8, someone must be. Only if there is a monarch is it possible for the monarch to calculate the improbability of her particular existence. Similarly, only if an intelligent species does evolve is it possible for its members to ask how probable it is for an intelligent species to evolve. Both are examples of WAP self-selection in action.110

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110 F. B. Salisbury, Nature 224, 342 (1969), argued that the enormous improbability of a given gene, which we computed in the text, means that a gene is too unique to come into being by natural selection acting on chance mutations. WAP self-selection refutes this argument, as R. F. Doolittle in Scientists confront creationism, L. R. Godfrey (Norton, NY, 1983) has also pointed out.{14}

Here we have a far-reaching implication that goes considerably beyond the apparently trivial WAP. Accordingly, although Barrow and Tipler conflate WAP and the implications thought to follow from it, I want to distinguish these sharply and shall refer to these broader implications as the Anthropic Philosophy. It is this philosophical viewpoint, rather than WAP itself, that I believe, despite initial impressions, stands opposed to the teleological argument and constitutes scientific naturalism's most recent answer to that argument. According to the Anthropic Philosophy, an attitude to surprise at the delicately balanced features of the universe essential to life is inappropriate; we should expect the universe to look this way. While this does not explain the origin of those features, it shows that no explanation is necessary. Hence, to posit a divine Designer is gratuitous.

Critique

WAP and Self-Selection

Now it needs to be emphasized that what the Anthropic Philosophy does not hold, despite the sloppy statements on this head often made by scientists, is that our existence as observers explains the basic features of the universe. The answer to the question "Why is the universe isotropic?" given by Collins and Hawking, ". . . the isotropy of the Universe is a consequence of our existence,"{15} is simply irresponsible and brings the Anthropic Philosophy into undeserved disrepute, for literally taken, such an answer would require some form of backward causation whereby the conditions of the early universe were brought about by us acting as efficient causes merely by our observing the heavens. But WAP neither asserts nor implies this; rather WAP holds that we must observe the universe to possess certain features (not that the universe must possess certain features) and the Anthropic Philosophy says that therefore these features ought not to surprise us or cry out for explanation. The self-selection effect affects our observations, not the basic features of the universe itself. If the Anthropic Philosophy held that the basic features of the universe were themselves brought about by our observations, then it could be rightly dismissed as fanciful. But the Anthropic Philosophy is much more subtle: it does not try to explain why the universe has the basic features it does, but contends that no explanation is needed, since we should not be surprised at observing what we do, our observations of those basic features being restricted by our own existence as observers.

But does the Anthropic Philosophy follow from the Anthropic Principle, as Barrow and Tipler claim? Let us concede that it follows from WAP that

3. We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.
For if the features of the universe were incompatible with our existence, we should not be here to notice it. Hence, it is not surprising that we do not observe such features. But it follows neither from WAP nor (3) that

4. We should not be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence.
For although the object of surprise in (4) might at first blush appear to be simply the contrapositive of the object of surprise in (3), this is mistaken. This can be clearly seen by means of an illustration (borrowed from John Leslie{16}): suppose you are dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all of them with rifles aimed at your heart, to be executed. The command is given; you hear the deafening sound of the guns. And you observe that you are still alive, that all of the 100 marksmen missed! Now while it is true that

5. You should not be surprised that you do not observe that you are dead,
nonetheless it is equally true that

6. You should be surprised that you do observe that you are alive.
Since the firing squad's missing you altogether is extremely improbable, the surprise expressed in (6) is wholly appropriate, though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it. Similarly, while we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our existence, it is nevertheless true that

7. We should be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence,
in view of the enormous improbability that the universe should possess such features.

The reason the falsity of (7) does not follow from (3) is that subimplication fails for first order predicate calculus. For (3) may be schematized as

3'. ~S: (x) ([Fx × ~Cx] É ~Ox)
where "S:" is an operator expressing "we should be surprised that" and "F" is "is a feature of the universe," "C" is "is compatible with our existence," and "O" is "is observed by us." And (7) may be schematized as

7'. S: ($x) (Fx × Cx × Ox)
It is clear that the object of surprise in (7') is not equivalent to the object of surprise in (3'); therefore the truth of (3') does not entail the negation of (7').{17}

Therefore, the attempt of the Anthropic Philosophy to stave off our surprise at the basic features of the universe fails. It does not after all follow from WAP that our surprise at the basic features of the universe is unwarranted or inappropriate and that they do not therefore cry out for explanation. But which features of the universe should thus surprise us? --those which are necessary conditions of our existence and which seem extremely improbable or whose coincidence seems extremely improbable. Thus, we should amend (7) to read

7*. We should be surprised that we do observe basic features of the universe which individually or collectively are excessively improbable and are necessary conditions of our own existence.
Against (7*), the WAP is impotent.{18}

WAP and a World Ensemble

Now proponents of the Anthropic Philosophy will no doubt contend that I have missed the whole point of the WAP. For (7*) is true only if the basic features of our observable universe are co-extensive with the basic features of the Universe as a whole. But proponents of the Anthropic Philosophy avoid (7*) by conjoining to WAP the hypothesis of a World Ensemble, that is to say, the hypothesis that our observable universe is but one member of a collection of diverse universes that go to make up a wider Universe-as-a-Whole. Given the existence of this wider Universe, it is argued that all possible universes are actualized and that the WAP reveals why surprise at our being in a universe with basic features essential to life is inappropriate.

Various theories, some of them quite fantastic, have been offered for generating a World Ensemble. For example, Wheeler proposes a model of the oscillating universe in which each cycle emerges with a new set of physical laws and constants.{19} Linde suggests an inflationary model according to which our observable universe is but one of many different mini-universes which inflated from the original larger Universe.{20} One of the most widely discussed World Ensemble scenarios is Everett's Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum physics, according to which all possible states of a quantum interaction are actualized, the observer himself splitting off into each of these different worlds.{21}

Now it needs to be emphasized that there is no evidence for any of these theories apart from the fact of intelligent life itself. But as John Leslie, the philosopher of science who has occupied himself most thoroughly with the Anthropic Principle, points out, any such evidence for a World Ensemble is equally evidence for a divine Designer.{22} Moreover, each of the above scenarios faces formidable scientific and philosophical objections.{23} Wheeler's theory, for example, not only succumbs to the problems generic to oscillating models,{24} but insofar as it posits singularities at the termini of each cycle, it is not even a model of an oscillating universe at all, but of just a series of unrelated worlds. Inflationary models not only face the problems of how to get the inflation started, how to get it to end without excess turbulence, and how to get it to allow galaxy formation, but more importantly they themselves require an extraordinary amount of fine-tuning prior to inflation, so that the appearance of design is not eluded. The Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum physics is so fantastic that philosopher of science John Earman characterizes its postulated splitting of space-time as a "miracle." "Not only is there no hint as to what causal mechanism would produce such a splitting," he complains, "there is not even a characterization of where and when it takes place."{25} In fact, Quentin Smith indicts the theory as incoherent, since the many worlds are supposed to exist in a timeless superspace, which is incompatible with the stipulation that they branch off serially as quantum interactions occur.{26}

Objections can be raised against each of the theories proposed for generating many worlds; but even if we conceded that a multiple universe scenario is unobjectionable, would such a move succeed in rescuing us from teleology and a cosmic Designer? This is not at all obvious. The fundamental assumption behind the Anthropic philosopher's reasoning in this regard seems to be something along the lines of

8. If the Universe contains an exhaustively random and infinite number of universes, then anything that can occur with non-vanishing probability will occur somewhere.
But why should we think that the number of universes is actually infinite? This is by no means inevitable, not to mention the paradoxical nature of the existence of an actually infinite number of things.{27} And why should we think that the multiple universes are exhaustively random? Again, this is not a necessary condition of many-worlds hypotheses. In order to elude the teleological argument, we are being asked to assume much more than the mere existence of multiple universes.

In any case, the move on the part of Anthropic philosophers to posit many worlds, even if viable, represents a significant concession because it implies that the popular use of the WAP to refute teleology in a Universe who properties are coextensive with the basic features of our universe is fallacious. In order to stave off the conclusion of a Designer, the Anthropic philosopher must take the metaphysically speculative step of embracing a special kind of multiple universe scenario. That will hardly commend itself to some as any less objectionable than theism.

The point is that the Anthropic Principle is impotent unless it is conjoined with a profoundly metaphysical vision of reality. According to Earman, "Some anthropic theorizers seem all too eager to embrace any form of world making that gives purchase to their modus operandi."{28} Why this desperation? John Leslie explains that although the idea of a World Ensemble is sketchy and faces powerful objections, still people think that it must be correct, for how else could life originate?{29} But Leslie argues that the God hypothesis is no more obscure than the World Ensemble nor less scientific, since natural laws and initial conditions are not generally taken to be scientifically explicable.{30} A scientist should consider the interpretation of a divine Designer, or else admit that he simply has no personal interest in the problem, for the only alternative to the World Ensemble is the God hypothesis, so that if we reject the latter we are stuck with the former.{31}

Martin Gardner, quoting physicist Heinz Pagels, says that the Anthropic Principle raises a new mystery:

"How can such a sterile idea," Pagels asks, "reproduce itself so prolifically?" He suspects it may be because scientists are reluctant to make a leap of faith and say: "The reason the universe seems tailor-made for our existence is that it was tailor-made . . . . Faced with questions that do not neatly fit into the framework of science, they are loath to resort to religious explanations; yet their curiosity will not let them leave matters unaddressed. Hence, the anthropic principle. It is the closest that some atheists can get to God."{32}
Similarly physicist Tony Rothman writes,

It's not a big step from the [Anthropic Principle] to the Argument from Design . . . . When confronted with the order and beauty of the universe and the strange coincidences of nature, it's very tempting to take the leap of faith from science into religion. I am sure many physicists want to. I only wish they would admit it.{33}
But if for atheist and timorous theist alike the World Ensemble and Anthropic Principle are functioning as a sort of God surrogate, what is so sad about this situation is that it is so unnecessary. For with the World Ensemble we have already launched our bark out onto the metaphysical deep; if the God hypothesis provides us a surer passage, why not avail ourselves of it? As Leslie reminds us, those who think that "science proper" has boundaries which are easy to fix are becoming increasingly rare.{34}

The Hypothesis of Divine Design

In any case, the philosopher who is a theist is certainly at liberty qua philosopher, if not qua scientist, to introduce God as his explanatory ultimate. What objections then might be raised against the theistic hypothesis? No friend of the Anthropic Principle, Earman seems sympathetic to the hypothesis of divine design, but in the end does not find it compelling because there is no need to adopt a creation theory of actuality, which this hypothesis presupposes:

If one adopts a creation story of actuality and if one calculates that the probability of creation of a big bang model having the features in question is nil, then no anthropic principle, construed as a selection principle, is going to resolve the problem. The resolution calls rather for something akin to the traditional argument from Design.
Alternatively, the need for a creation story of actuality and the need to wrestle with improbabilities of actualization can be obviated by treating actuality as a token-reflexive property of possible worlds not unlike the 'nowness' property of instants of time (see Lewis 1986). On this view all possible worlds, including the merely logically possible as well as the physically possible, are all equally 'actual'. No Creator is needed to anoint one of these worlds with the magical property of 'actuality' and the question of why this property was conferred upon a world having the features in question is mooted.{35}
Here we see the metaphysically extravagant lengths to which philosophers seem compelled to go in order to avoid a divine Designer. Earman, while excoriating Anthropic philosophers for their unwarranted postulate of a World Ensemble, shows himself quite willing to go even further, postulating the actual existence of all logically possible worlds. This involves a metaphysical commitment which is so enormous ontologically and so superfluous for explaining modal locutions that most philosophers have dismissed it as science fiction. Indeed, Plantinga has shown that such a theory of actuality entails the outrageous view that I have all my properties essentially, since it is not I, but a counterpart of me, who exists and possesses different properties in other logically possible worlds.{36} In comparison with Earman's commitment, the hypothesis of theism seems modest indeed.

Barrow and Tipler also object to the hypothesis of divine design, maintaining that "careful thinkers" would not today "jump so readily" to a Designer, for (i) the modern viewpoint stresses time's role in nature; but since an unfinished watch does not work, arguments based on omnipresent harmony have been abandoned for arguments based on co-present coincidences; and (ii) scientific models aim to be realistic, but are in fact only approximations of reality; so we hesitate to draw far-reaching conclusions about the nature of ultimate reality from models that are at some level inaccurate.{37} But Barrow and Tipler seem unduly diffident here. A careful thinker will not readily jump to any conclusion, but why may he not infer a divine Designer after a careful consideration of the evidence? Point (i) is misleading, since the operations of nature always work; at an earlier time nature is not like an unfinished watch, rather it is just a less complex watch.{38} In any case, the most powerful design argument will appeal to both present adaptedness and co-present coincidences. Point (ii) loses much of its force in light of two considerations: (a) this is a condition that affects virtually all our knowledge, which is to say that it affects none of it in particular, so that our only recourse is simply to draw conclusions based on what we determine most accurately to reflect reality; fortunately, the evidence at issue here is rather concrete and so possesses a high degree of objectivity; (b) Barrow and Tipler do not feel compelled to exercise such restraint when proposing metaphysically speculative but naturalistic accounts of the universe's basic features, for example, their defense of the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum physics or scenarios for the origin of the universe ex nihilo, which leads one to suspect that a double standard is being employed here. Their objections, therefore, seem to have little force.

John Leslie's reservations with the theistic hypothesis are somewhat different: while concurring with the necessity of positing a divine Designer of the cosmos, he nonetheless argues that the ultimate explanation of the order in the universe cannot be God as traditionally conceived. Leslie plumps for what he characterizes as a Neo-platonic concept of God as the creativity of ethical requiredness. That is to say, if I understand Leslie correctly, the universe exists as it does because it should; it is morally necessary that a universe of free agents exist. This ethical requiredness of the universe has a sort of creative power to it that makes the world exist. If there is a personal deity, he, too, is the result of this more fundamental principle. Presumably, Leslie calls this conception Neo-platonic because according to that metaphysic the One, which takes the place of Plato's Good, produces being, the first emanation being the Nous, or Mind, which in turn produces the world. The God of traditional theism would be like Plotinus's Nous and Leslie's God like the ultimate form of the Good.

But why is the traditional concept of God so unpalatable? Leslie's critique on this score is disappointing and surprisingly weak.{39} Proceeding from the Leibnizian question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Leslie rejects the answer of God conceived as either a factually or a logically necessary being. For if God is only factually necessary, then He exists logically contingently, albeit eternally, and no reason is supplied for His contingent existence. On the other hand, God cannot be shown to exist necessarily in the logical sense, for when the ontological argument asserts, "It is possible that God exist," this possibility is epistemic only and, hence, does not show that God's existence is logically possible.

But this objection seems confused. If God is merely a factually necessary being, then there are possible worlds in which He does not exist. But then it is logically impossible for Him to exist in all possible worlds, that is to say, it is logically necessary that He exist contingently. But then, assuming that God is the explanatory ultimate in any world in which He exists, it makes no sense to seek a reason for His existence. To demand a reason for His existence is to ask for a logically necessary being which accounts for the fact that God exists. But on this hypothesis, it is logically impossible that there be such a being, for if it were possible such a being would exist in every possible world, including this one, and so God would not be the explanatory ultimate. Hence, if God is a mere factually necessary being, it is logically impossible for there to be a reason for His existence. One need only add that it is wrong-headed to indict a position for not supplying what is logically impossible.

On the other hand, why hold that God is merely factually necessary? The Leibnizian Principle of Sufficient Reason might lead us to reject the concept of God as a merely factually necessary being and hold instead that He is logically necessary. The failure of the ontological argument as a piece of natural theology is irrelevant to the coherence of this conception of God. Leslie correctly points out that when the ontological argument asserts that the proposition "A maximally great being exists" (where maximal greatness entails being omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in every possible world) is possible, there is an ambiguity between "epistemically possible" and "logically possible." To say that such a proposition is epistemically possible is only to say that for all we know it is true. So understood, it makes sense to say, "Possibly a maximally great being exists, and possibly He doesn't." This sense is insufficient for the purposes of the ontological argument. But if we are talking about logical possibility, then to say that the proposition "A maximally great being exists" is possible is to say that He does exist. For if He exists in any possible world, then by definition He exists in all. Thus, if this proposition is possibly true in the logical sense, it is necessarily true. Now I agree with Leslie that the ontological argument seems to fail because all we intuit is that a maximally great being is epistemically possible, but we cannot say if His existence is logically possible. But how is this even relevant to the issue at hand? The coherence of the logical necessity of God's existence does not depend on the success of the ontological argument or our intuitions. It is possible that the ontological argument fails to prove God's existence, and yet for all we know God's existence is logically necessary. Philosophers such as Plantinga, Robert Adams, and William Rowe have defended the coherence of God as a logically necessary being,{40} and Leslie says nothing to impugn this notion. Using the Leibnizian query as his starting point, Leslie ought to conclude to the existence of a being which is by nature such that if it exists in any possible world, it exists in all; such a being must exist in this world in order to explain why something exists rather than nothing, and, therefore, in all worlds, thereby obviating the need for an explanation of its existence.{41} In this way Leslie's quite legitimate demand for a reason for the existence of something rather than nothing would yield an answer for the universe's existence without requiring one for God's existence, and this without endorsing the ontological argument.

As for Leslie's own alternative conception of God, I think that its lack of explanatory power seems painfully clear. How can there be design without the previsioning of an intelligent mind? Personal agents, not impersonal principles, design things. If one says that the traditional God is a sort of personal demiurge who designed the world, then how can he be produced in being by an abstract principle? Abstract objects such as numbers, propositions, and properties have no spatio-temporal locations and sustain no causal relations with concrete objects. So how does the abstract object posited by Leslie cause a concrete object like God to exist? It thus seems clear that traditional theism is the preferable explanation of the world's design.

Concluding Remarks

Teleologists and Anthropic philosophers enjoy a peculiar "love/hate" relationship: they agree that the delicate balance of cosmological and physical conditions necessary for intelligent life does cry out for some sort of interpretation which will render it intelligible; but they differ radically as to what that interpretation should be. Theistic philosophers view this sensitive nexus of conditions as evidence of wider teleology and therefore indicative of a cosmic Designer. Anthropic philosophers contend that due to the self-selection effect imposed by our own existence we can only observe a limited number of worlds; therefore, we should not be surprised at observing this one. Moreover, if a Word Ensemble exists in which all possible values of cosmological and physical quantities are somewhere instantiated, it follows necessarily that our world with its delicate balance of conditions will also obtain. We have seen, however, that in the absence of the hypothesis of the World Ensemble the reasoning of the Anthropic philosopher, based on the trivial WAP is simply logically fallacious. As for the World Ensemble, there is not only no evidence that such an ensemble of worlds exists, but there are substantive objections against each of the proposed means of generating such an ensemble. In any case, the postulation of a world ensemble is metaphysically extravagant, for it must involve the existence of an infinite number of exhaustively random worlds if one is to guarantee that our world will by chance alone obtain in the ensemble. Theism is certainly no more objectionable than this.

Finally, I should like to say a word concerning the religious value of the hypothesis of divine design as an explanation for the wider teleology we have discovered in nature. As the debate over the Anthropic Principle has spread, it has even taken on literary dimensions, finding its way into the contemporary novel Roger's Version by John Updike. When Dale Kohler explains that physicists are proving the existence of God, Roger Lambert, a professor of theology, replies:

For myself I must confess that I find your whole idea aesthetically and ethically repulsive. Aesthetically because it describes a God Who lets Himself be intellectually trapped, and ethically because it eliminates faith from religion, it takes away our freedom to believe or doubt. A God you could prove makes the whole thing immensely, oh, uninteresting. Pat. Whatever else God may be, He shouldn't be pat.{42}
Roger's objections, so typical of contemporary theology, reveal fundamental misunderstandings about the revelation of God and the nature of faith. God's handiwork in nature is not a matter of His being intellectually trapped, but of His revelation of Himself to His creation, a self-disclosure which is aesthetically beautiful; as the Psalmist says, "The heavens are telling the glory of God and the firmament proclaims his handiwork" (Ps. 19.1). And the decision to believe in God or not is not so much a matter of assensus, but of fiducia. The demonstration of His existence on the basis of His created order in no way removes our freedom to trust in ourselves rather than in Him; as Paul wrote, "although they knew God, they did not honor him as God . . ." (Rom. 1.21). The teleological argument, then, if successful, hardly makes belief in God pat.{43} Rather it helps to bring us more quickly to the true crisis of faith.